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# ***JPRS Report—***

## **Proliferation Issues**

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# PROLIFERATION ISSUES

JPRS-TND-92-022

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10 July 1992

[This report contains foreign media information on issues related to worldwide proliferation and transfer activities in nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, including delivery systems and the transfer of weapons-relevant technologies.]

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## NORTH KOREA

### IAEA Starts Second Nuclear Inspection

SK0707011092 Seoul KBS-1 Radio Network in Korean  
2300 GMT 6 Jul 92

[Text] The second ad hoc nuclear inspection [imsi haeksachal] of North Korea has started. The International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] started an ad hoc nuclear inspection of North Korea on 6 July and will intensively inspect the Yongbyon nuclear complex until 17 July. Cha Man-sun reports from Vienna:

[Begin Cha recording] The IAEA began its second ad hoc nuclear inspection of North Korea yesterday. The IAEA sent to North Korea a six-member inspection team headed by (Tice), director responsible for the Asian region, on 4 July and began conducting the ad hoc nuclear inspection of nuclear facilities in Yonbyon on 6 July.

The IAEA's ad hoc nuclear inspection this time, which is the second one following a two-week inspection last May, will continue until 17 July. An IAEA source revealed that the ad hoc inspection of North Korea will be intensively focused on the construction of the nuclear reprocessing facilities in Yongbyon, which was an issue raised at the Board of Governors meeting last June, and whether these large-scale nuclear reprocessing facilities are really necessary for the size of the present reactor and for its functions.

In its inspection, the ad hoc inspection team also plans to focus on how much plutonium North Korea has produced, its storage condition, and, in particular, the safety of the reactor in operation. [end recording]

### U.S., Russia Welcome IAEA Control

LD1806202292 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service  
in Russian 1142 GMT 18 Jun 92

[“Joint Russian-American Statement on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons on the Korean Peninsula”—ITAR-TASS headline]

[Text] [No dateline as received]—The Russian Federation and the United States of America, supporting the efforts of the international community in the field of countering the proliferation of nuclear weapons, note the positive changes in the matter of strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation system in Korea. They welcome the joint declaration between the Koreas of 31 December 1991 on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, and call for the full implementation of this agreement, which is a significant contribution to strengthening peace and security in the region, and also in achieving reconciliation and stability on the Korean peninsula.

The sides welcome the ratification by the DPRK of the control agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] and call on it to cooperate further with

the agency for the purpose of placing its nuclear installations under appropriate control. The complete fulfillment by the DPRK of its obligations under the Nonproliferation Treaty and the joint declaration between the Koreas, including IAEA control, alongside reliable and effective reciprocal nuclear inspections would make it possible finally to dispel international concern regarding the nuclear problem on the Korean peninsula.

### Kim Il-song Wants U.S. ‘Involved’ in Talks

OW0107113992 Tokyo KYODO in English 1104 GMT  
1 Jul 92

[Text] Seoul, July 1 KYODO—North Korean President Kim Il-song wants the United States to “get involved” in inter-Korean talks on nuclear inspections, a Washington-based analyst said Wednesday.

William Taylor, vice president of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said Kim expressed hope for improved dialogue with Washington in a meeting with him Sunday in Pyongyang.

The two Koreas remain apart on mutual nuclear inspections after several months of talks.

Taylor told KYODO NEWS SERVICE that Kim said some inter-Korean issues could not be solved directly, as Seoul does not control decisions on U.S. military bases in South Korea.

“The U.S. must get involved in the discussion with the DPRK (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea),” Taylor quoted Kim as saying.

Kim said Pyongyang’s recent compliance with international nuclear inspections was tied to Washington agreeing to high-level bilateral talks, according to Taylor.

He was referring to International Atomic Energy Association inspections in May and January talks in New York between U.S. Undersecretary of State Arnold Kanter and Kim Yong-sun, North Korea’s secretary of international affairs.

Pyongyang has expressed a desire to establish diplomatic relations with the United States, but Washington has tied talks to the IAEA inspections of facilities that Western intelligence reports are being used to develop nuclear weapons.

Kim reiterated North Korea’s stand that it has no nuclear weapons program, maintaining it has shown “everybody everything,” Taylor said.

“We had done everything we said we would do faster than anybody thought,” Taylor quoted Kim as saying, indicating future inspections could be accelerated by continued high-level bilateral talks.

The North Korean leader said the inter-Korean nuclear inspections will depend upon “how forthcoming the South is,” according to Taylor.

Since March, nuclear control negotiators from the two Koreas have met for six rounds of talks over mutual inspections but have failed to narrow differences over details.

The North has demanded that the U.S. open its Korean bases to inspections, but the talks snagged over North Korea's reluctance to permit checks of its military bases or submit to short-notice "challenge" inspections of its facilities Washington says are being used to develop nuclear weapons.

### South Seeking Aid From Moscow on Denuclearization

SK0307044992 Pyongyang KCNA in English  
0423 GMT 3 Jul 92

[Text] Pyongyang July 3 (KCNA)—The South Korean "foreign minister" recently flew to Moscow and prattled that "suspicion of nuclear development" by the North was the "biggest obstacle to the improvement of the North-South relations" and entreated Moscow for "cooperation" in the "denuclearization" of the Korean peninsula, according to a report.

This is a mean act that can be done only by those who are accustomed to committing treacherous acts with others' backing.

The nuclear problem on the Korean peninsula was caused by the conversion of South Korea into a nuclear base of the United States and the denuclearisation on the Korean peninsula can be carried out only when the U.S. nuclear weapons are withdrawn from South Korea.

That the North's nuclear development is for a peaceful purpose has been proven by the results of the recent inspection of the North by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

This notwithstanding, the South Korean authorities sent the "foreign minister" to other's home and made him repeatedly cry for "mutual inspection," twanging the old tune of "suspicion of nuclear development" by the North. This is the height of folly.

This is a ruse to evade an overall inspection of the U.S. nuclear weapons and nuclear bases in South Korea at any cost and justify this traitorous act with the help of others.

### Japan Conditions Ties on Dispelling Doubts

SK0207031992 Seoul YONHAP in English  
0301 GMT 2 Jul 92

[Excerpts] Seoul, July 2 (OANA-YONHAP)—Tokyo will not normalize ties with Pyongyang until Pyongyang agrees to inter-Korean nuclear inspections and dispels suspicions of nuclear arms development, Japanese Ambassador to South Korea Kenichi Yanagi said Thursday. [passage omitted]

North Korea's nuclear suspicion posed a serious threat not only to South Korea but to Japan as well, the ambassador said.

"Japan is demanding North Korea unconditionally and completely implement the terms of the Nuclear Safeguards Accord with the International Atomic Energy Agency and abide by the joint declaration of the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, including the inter-Korean nuclear inspection," he said.

"We stress that it is important for North Korea to dispel the international community's suspicion against its nuclear problem through these means. Without solving the nuclear problem, Tokyo-Pyongyang diplomatic normalization is difficult."

Japan had not forgotten the five principles South Korean President No Tae-u set forth to Tokyo when discussing diplomatic normalization between Japan and North Korea, Yanagi said.

The five principles, presented before North Korea signed the Nuclear Safeguards Accord with the IAEA, simply say that North Korea must join the accord.

Japan has never gone on record to say North Korea's acceptance of inter-Korean nuclear inspection was a condition for normalization of Tokyo-Pyongyang ties. [passage omitted]

### SOUTH KOREA

#### Seoul Hopes To Resolve 'Deadlock' With North

SK0607121492 Seoul YONHAP in English  
1155 GMT 6 Jul 92

[Text] Seoul, July 6 (YONHAP)—North Korea, with its welcoming Monday of the recent U.S. declaration that it has withdrawn all tactical nuclear weapons from Europe and Asia including Korea, may ease its demand for look into U.S. military installations in the South in proposed inter-Korean nuclear inspections.

In this connection, the government Monday decided to work out steps to take to provide a breakthrough in the deadlocked inter-Korean nuclear talks should the North actually soften up its position.

The government believes that Pyongyang's official welcoming of U.S. President George Bush's statement Sunday may be akin to their recognition of the withdrawal of American nuclear weapons from South Korea.

Seoul, therefore, expects some change would possibly come in the North's posture toward the nuclear issue.

In the past, Pyongyang demanded that simultaneous inspections be made of their Yongbyon nuclear center and U.S. military installations in South Korea.

They said they could not believe President No Tae-u's declaration last December of non-presence of nuclear

weapons in the South, demanding that the top leader of the U.S., the direct party involved in the deployment of nuclear arms, should formally disclose their withdrawal of nuclear weapons.

In this connection, a Foreign Ministry official said Monday, "If the North gives up the demand for inspection of U.S. military installations, we too can show a flexibility in our current policy to include North Korean military bases in the list to be inspected."

The official said that if the North abandons the demand, the two sides could drop inspections of both sides' military installations and instead adopt a clause allowing both sides the right to look into suspected areas in special inspections.

"It remains to be seen whether the North would give up their call for probe into U.S. military installations. But, there would be some form of change in their attitude as they feel the need more than ever to improve ties with Washington following Foreign Minister Yi Sang-ok's recent tour of the Commonwealth of Independent States," he said.

In a statement released by the Foreign Ministry, North Korea said it welcomed as "progressive" Bush's declaration that the U.S. had withdrawn all tactical nuclear weapons from Europe and Asia.

The statement said that smooth solution of the nuclear issue would be possible now that the U.S. had made public the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from South Korea.

#### **Editorial Welcomes U.S. Withdrawal of Nukes**

SK0407015192 Seoul *THE KOREA HERALD*  
in English 4 Jul 92 p 6

[Editorial: "U.S. Withdrawal of Tactical Nukes"]

[Text] U.S. President George Bush's historic announcement Thursday that the United States had completed the planned withdrawal of ground-launched tactical and naval nuclear weapons from its overseas bases surely signals, both materially and symbolically, the beginning of a new era in which the superpowers can be truly geared toward closer cooperation for world peace. At the culmination of the stirring announcement, President Bush said that the superpowers can now take further steps to make the world a less dangerous place than ever before in the nuclear age.

Bush was quick to point out in the statement that these historic measures would not have been possible without the support of the leaders of the former Soviet republics, particularly Russian President Boris Yeltsin, who reciprocated the U.S. steps by destroying inventories of ground-launched tactical nuclear weapons.

Even in modest terms, the complete withdrawal of the tactical nuclear arms overseas marks one of the broadest and most comprehensive changes in U.S. nuclear

strategy since the start of the nuclear arms race in the early 1950s. The whole scheme was aimed not so much at merely lowering worldwide military tension as in creating a new West-East relation that surely fits into new world order.

However, nuclear arms control cannot be limited to the superpowers. It should be expanded so as to embrace the Third World, given the threats posed by potential nuclear and missile proliferation elsewhere. This naturally brings attention to the nuclear potential of North Korea whose real intention, despite submission to initial inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), is yet to be known because it adamantly refuses to comply with the Seoul-proposed inter-Korean nuclear inspection. Pyongyang has used all plausible pretexts to avoid South-North mutual inspection. But, the latest U.S. measures will leave no excuse whatsoever for North Korea to retain such recalcitrance.

As expressed by President Bush and Japanese Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa in their Washington summit earlier this week, superpowers must continuously work together to eliminate the suspicion standing in the way of removing all the legacies of the cold war from this part of the world. Their influence should be so directed as to induce stability and reconciliation in Korea and in the Northeast Asian region. The U.S. withdrawal of overseas nuclear arms is looked upon to become a tangible result of the collapse of the cold war.

#### **World 'Consensus' on Inter-Korean Inspections**

SK0307012592 Seoul *THE KOREA TIMES* in English  
3 Jul 92 p 6

[Editorial: "International Pressure on Pyongyang"]

[Text] An international consensus is building up, calling for North Korea's compliance with Seoul-proposed inter-Korean nuclear inspections, in addition to probes of the North Korean nuclear facilities by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), putting the Pyongyang regime under increasing pressure to renounce the development of an atomic weapons capability.

In a just-ended meeting in Washington, U.S. President George Bush and Japanese Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa shared the view that unless Pyongyang accepts inter-Korean bilateral inspections, neither of their two countries would normalize diplomatic relations with it. The leaders further agreed to take joint steps against the North's nuclear and missile proliferation, in clear support for the Seoul government's position.

In a related development, the 12-member European Community in a joint statement demanded North Korea accept mutual nuclear inspections by the two Koreas as well as halt its exports of missiles, as a prerequisite to the settlement of the Korean question. The EC had hitherto been less interested in regional affairs like the Korean question.

The increasing concern at the IAEA about the nuclear problem on the Korean peninsula appears to have led to the EC's issuing the strong demand. Such worldwide requests for bilateral inspections could be a stepping stone for further action against Pyongyang, if and when it continues to defy them.

Pyongyang's rejection of inter-Korean inspections could be a plausible reason for South Korea and its Western allies to seek international pressure against the North in the form of United Nations Security Council member, is basically opposed to the North's nuclear weapons development scheme.

The Pyongyang leadership has been undoubtedly attempting to avoid simultaneous South-North inspections by compliance with less stringent IAEA probes. Nonetheless, the North should realize that this is the right time for it to open up its nuclear facilities and abandon for good its secret scheme to seek a nuclear weapons capability.

In return for this, the Pyongyang regime could gain what seem to be undeserved favors from the outside such as access to much-needed economic and technological aid from the Western industrialized nations. But more than this, the North should note that the future inter-Korean relationship will entirely depend on the solution to the nuclear issue.

### Seoul May Revise Nuclear Inspection Regime

SK0607095292 Seoul YONHAP in English  
0935 GMT 6 Jul 92

[Text] Seoul, July 6 (OANA-YONHAP)—South Korea may abolish distinction between civilian and military facilities in the inter-Korean nuclear inspection regime in its bid to break the current deadlock in the negotiations, government sources said Monday.

South Korea will take this step only when North Korea drops its demand to see all of U.S. military bases in the South in exchange for just showing its Yongbyon complex, they said.

But, there have been indications that North Korea will be flexible in this demand, according to the sources. The latest indication was a statement by the North Korean Foreign Ministry that it "welcomes" U.S. announcement of complete withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from Europe and Asia, including South Korea.

"We will have to study the statement in more detail, but it certainly is a step toward accepting Seoul's and Washington's insistence that there are no longer any nuclear weapons deployed on South Korean soil," one official said.

Pyongyang recently showed extreme eagerness to improve relations with Washington, which may impel it to be more willing in inter-Korean nuclear negotiations, he said.

North Korean leader Kim Il-song admitted to William Taylor, vice president of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), of his country's economic plight, especially after the former Soviet Union cut off oil supply.

Kim urged for U.S. economic and technological assistance and asked for promotion of American tourists to North Korea, the official said.

If Pyongyang decides to believe South Korean and U.S. announcements of nuclear withdrawal and back away from its demand to see American military bases in the South, then Seoul will not insist on specifically distinguishing between civilian and military installations in the nuclear regime, according to the sources.

Seoul will instead call for inspection on "sites suspected of storing nuclear materials or weapons," they said. This would solve North Korea's unwillingness to open its military sites to South Korean inspectors.

"But there is no change in our demands for challenge inspection," the official said.

Challenge inspection, another centerpiece to inter-Korean nuclear negotiations, would pry open a suspected site after a 24-hour notice.

"We could start the inspection on just civilian facilities. But we insist on having the right to see any suspected installations on short notice," he said.

### LAOS

#### Foreign Ministry Denies Chemical Arms Reports

BK0407102592 Vientiane KPL in English  
0917 GMT 4 Jul 92

[“Lao Foreign Ministry's stance on the allegation that Lao soldiers are trained in chemical weapons use”—KPL headline]

[Text] Vientiane, July 4 (KPL)—The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Lao People's Democratic Republic has made it clear the stance of the Lao government over a statement by Thai Supreme Command Spokesman Lt. [Lieutenant] General [Gen.] Anuson published in Bangkok Post of June 30, 1992, that recently Lao soldiers have been trained in chemical weapons application. In his statement the Thai lieutenant general also said that "if it is true, we may even lodge a protest."

This statement by Lt. Gen. Anuson drew a great deal of the public attention. On July 1, 1992, Lao Ambassador to Thailand Bounkeut Sangsomsak gave an interview to the Thai mass media categorically denying such a groundless news report.

In addition, the Lao ambassador was instructed by the Lao Foreign Ministry to meet with the Thai military authority and the Thai Foreign Ministry's authority to

get informed about the intention of the speaker because his words were seen unconstructive to and did not at all help promote the existing good relations between the two countries. Particularly, this news report came about shortly after the last month's historic visit to Laos by the Thai crown prince.

Moreover, this statement also would cause doubt and misunderstanding between the two sides. As a matter of fact, in the relations between the military authorities of the two sides there are the joint military committees for border stability and security. Thai Lt. Gen. Anuson could raise the issue for discussion in these committees.

On July 2, 1992, Mr Alounkeo Kittikhoun, director of the Lao Foreign Ministry's International Organisations Department summoned to the ministry the Thai ambassador to Laos, Nikhom Tantemsap, to clarify the issue and to inform the Thai Government about the Lao Government's stance and concern over the Thai lieutenant general's groundless statement.

The Lao Government strongly affirms that Lao soldiers have never used chemical weapons and have neither the capacity to have such weapons in their possession nor invited military experts from any country to conduct a military training in this field in Laos.

**BULGARIA****Reports on Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant****Experts Disfavor Reconstruction**

AU0707180192 Sofia BTA in English  
1359 GMT 7 Jul 92

[Text] Sofia, July 7 (BTA)—A group of Bulgarian nuclear physicists, radiologists, power engineers and other experts have sent a memorandum to the G-7 summit in Munich, Germany, in which they say that it would be “unjustified and dangerous to invest large funds into the reconstruction and ‘making safe’ of the four older reactors of the VVER-440 type,” at the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant. “These reactors are genetically flawed by design and, as demonstrated by numerous international rounds of expertise, no amount of reconstruction will bring them close to the European safety standards,” the Bulgarian experts claim. They insist that an investment in the reconstruction of these reactors “will allow their exploitation to go on, posing a threat to, and holding hostage the entire European community.” The experts insist that instead, funds be invested in the early shutdown and burial of the old VVER-440 reactors, in the reconstruction and modernization of other Bulgarian generating facilities and in the introduction of other ecologically sustainable energy sources. “Bulgaria’s main problem is not the shortage of power-generating capacity but rather the use of energy-wasteful technologies and the inefficient utilization of generated power. Therefore, any investment in the overhaul of the old nuclear facilities would maintain unjustified risks of a serious accident. Such investment would stimulate extensive economic development, i.e. A reproduction of poverty,” the Bulgarian experts write to the G-7 summit.

**Siemens Group Visits Plant**

AU0707195192 Sofia BTA in English  
1758 GMT 7 Jul 92

[Text] Sofia, June 7 (BTA)—A delegation of Siemens AG, taking part in the EC-financed programme to enhance the safety of the old reactors at the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant, visited the plant today and said they were very favourably impressed by the design and building of Generating Unit Five. Mr. Wulf Buerkle, director of Siemens’ Nuclear Power Generation Division, said that Unit Two was in a better condition, too. Work is advancing on the repair of Units One and Two. Siemens is ready to deliver and install ahead of schedule the systems for acoustic control of leaks in the first two units. The systems have been ordered at Siemens as part of the programme. The company has prepared a more comprehensive programme of technical improvements of the four VVER reactors which would help increase their operational safety.

If and when this programme is carried out, the German experts said, the service life of the reactors of this type could be prolonged. Mr. Buerkle and Mr. Volker Jung,

member of the Siemens Board of Directors, confirmed the company’s desire to assume commitments in Bulgaria not only in the nuclear power plant but also in the construction of gas-fuelled steam thermoelectric power stations and in the formation of joint ventures in telecommunications and medical engineering maintenance.

**CZECHOSLOVAKIA****Uranium Seized in Austria Not From Dukovany**

AU3006113492 Prague CSTK in English  
2038 GMT 26 Jun 92

[Text] Prague—It is practically impossible that the tablets containing enriched uranium and seized by Austrian police from smugglers in Vienna two weeks ago would come from the Czechoslovak nuclear power plant in Dukovany, South Moravia, the Czech Power Engineering Enterprise (CEZ) said in a statement passed to CSTK today.

**POLAND****Russian Army Deserters Reportedly Stole C-137**

LD0807102592 Warsaw Third Program Radio Network in Polish 0900 GMT 8 Jul 92

[Text] Three containers containing a radioactive element, C-137, have been stolen from a garrison of the Russian forces in Borne Sulinowo in the Koszalin voivodship. It happened on 29 June, but the Russian prosecutor only reported it to the Koszalin police yesterday.

The perpetrators are two deserters who, of their own accord, left the convoy of soldiers departing for Russia. They are using a Zhiguli car, registration number KOG3103. The police are already on their trail.

**ROMANIA****Thefts of Radioactive Material in 1991-1992**

AU2406115592 Bucharest ROMPRES in English  
0758 GMT 24 Jun 92

[Excerpts] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 24/6/1992—The General Inspectorate of the Romanian Police announced that over 1991—1992 it had discovered 22 cases of drug traffic involving 25 foreign citizens. From them it confiscated 14.213 kg of heroin, 13.170 kg cocaine and 10.980 opium. [passage omitted]

Over the same period the police have also found infractions of the explosive and radioactive materials legislation, confiscating 245 kg of dynamite and astralite and more than 25,000 electric and pyrotechnic primers.

The police also identified and sent to trial three groups of criminals—who had been operating in six Romanian counties—confiscating 224.530 kg of nuclear fuel.

## ARGENTINA

**Content of New Book on Condor II Viewed**  
92WP0249A Buenos Aires SOMOS in Spanish  
8 June 92 pp 18- 21

[Report by J.G.: "The Condor Is Still Going Strong"]

[Text] Ambassador Terence Todman received the call from Washington in his residence in Buenos Aires, an immense turn-of-the-century mansion located on the elegant Avenida del Libertador, near the Palermo Hippodrome. On the secure telephone he was told to increase pressure on the Argentine government in order to determine with certainty where and to what extent there had been a technology transfer from the Condor program.

Sources reported that the call was made between the first and second week of September 1990. The ambassador lost no time and immediately called his friend the president.

Todman's query to Carlos Menem led to Jose Julia's invitation to the U.S. diplomat:

"If you want to visit Falda del Carmen, I will take you there," he told the diplomat.

Todman did not need to see anything in person. His objective was different, and the orders he had received led him to become a very high-level spy. He had to obtain that information. Also, might Argentina be a member of the select club of countries with access to missile technology? The U.S. State Department did not want any part of such a project to reach the Middle East or any of the Arab countries, except for Egypt or Iraq, which did not matter. So that and only that was to be Todman's project. (Start of Chapter IV of the book "Carnal Relations: The True Story of the Construction and Destruction of the Condor II Missile").

The revelation that two almost-complete Condor II missiles were just about ready to be launched at any moment and were stored in a secret arsenal by the Air Force triggered both national and international reactions, as it was bound to do.

This report is contained in a book by two journalists, Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga, soon to be published by Editorial Planeta. After an official denial by the Defense Ministry last Monday, on Tuesday a clarification was issued by the Foreign Ministry, admitting that two missiles from the Condor program did remain armed and "cannot be dismantled."

However, another aspect of the investigation, the "Arab connection" in international arms purchases and sales, leads into an unknown dimension, one that is almost always fertile terrain for espionage tales and novels. In this case the story spells out some names that are very close to the Argentines. Along with Menem, Todman, and Julia, there is King Hassan II of Morocco, the

legendary Hector "Pajaro" [Birdman] Villalon, Alfredo Carim Yoma, and the secret services of the major western powers. In this report SOMOS sheds some light on the covert workings of a deal that placed, and still places, Buenos Aires in the center of an international conspiracy.

### I Sell Missiles...

"From Argentina," say the authors, "came only 12 missile propulsion systems bound for Egypt, transported by Argentine Air Force Hercules C-130 aircraft in six successive flights. The transfer operation began at the end of 1985 and was completed in early 1988, several months after the fate of Condor II was sealed by the central countries and the political career of Egyptian Field Marshall Abu Ghazala began to unravel."

The attempts to sell the missile—or the project as a whole—to any Arab country had Brigadier General Ernesto Crespo on center stage. There were also some complex diversionary operations with the Iran-Contra scandal as a backdrop.

"The Israelis were fully informed about what we were doing. A Jewish businessman in the arms business even told me some information that we did not know. When Alfonsin went to the United States in October 1985 to present what was called the Houston Plan, Caputo did not attend the president's presentation. This Jewish businessmen assured me that he had met with Arab businessmen in a meeting arranged in Texas by the Saudi ambassador to the United States." The testimony of Raul Tomas, Raul Alfonsin's secretary of defense production, was completed with the Saudis' offer: they were prepared to make "big investments" in Argentina if, in exchange, Argentina would stop selling grain to Iran and start supplying Iran's archenemy: Saddam's regime.

This is the context in which Tomas's and Caputo's meeting with Hassan II took place early in 1986.

The minister and the secretary met in Biarritz, and from there went to Madrid. From there they traveled incognito via air taxi to Rabat, the capital of Morocco. After waiting for a day, the intermediary who had arranged the meeting took them to Hassan's summer palace. The monarch agreed with Caputo that his country could be the port of entry to the Arab world that Argentina needed and emphasized the deals with Iraq, which was then supported by the West in its war against Iranian fundamentalism.

The intermediary who took Caputo and Tomas to Morocco turned out to be a brother-in-law of Adnan Khashoggi, the Saudi businessman implicated in Iran-Contra who through his relative managed to suspend for some time the prosperous trade relations between Tehran and Buenos Aires. This intelligence maneuver blocked, among other things, the sale of Argentine missile-launching frigates to Iran and an increase in the amount of grain shipments that the Iranian officials were insistently seeking from their Buenos Aires counterparts.

Behind the offers to Caputo in Texas and the meeting with Hassan lurked the CIA and the Israelis.

#### Saddam Wanted It

At about the same time, the Defense Ministry was deluged with a number of offers to represent the Argentine Armed Forces in negotiations with Iraq for the undercover purpose of providing it with cheap weapons for which Saddam was paying ridiculous prices in other markets. Hector "Pajaro" Villalon's smooth contacts in Iraq and France (one of the biggest suppliers to the "secular and progressive" Baghdad regime) were offered to Tomas in 1987. Horacio Calderon, another businessman involved in arms sales, wanted to be the middleman with the Iraqi regime, with which he demonstrated his excellent connections. Egypt was beginning to discontinue its payments to finance the manufacture of missile propulsion systems in the secret facility built into a hillside at the Cordoban Falda del Carmen site. This was the time for Saddam to make a strong bid, and an emissary met with two brigadier generals close to the project.

The then defense minister, Horacio Jaunarena, turned down the offer because it would escalate the project and put Argentina in the center of a very hot spot.

Nevertheless, for those who claim that the Argentine pilots provided dozens of Condor missiles to Saddam Husayn's arsenal, it suffices to say that the same consortium that closed the deal with the Air Force in 1979 did the same thing four years later in Egypt. The proposal rejected by Jaunarena in 1988 came from the same business group, a group of German origin. This proves that the technology transfer denounced by Domingo Cavallo when he was minister of foreign relations had actually taken place "earlier in the game."

Saddam's diabolical character was just discovered in mid-1990, when he decided to move—with the third most powerful army in the world—into Kuwait, to which he owed a little more than \$70 billion after the end of Iraq's war with Iran.

The terror aroused in Western governments by the spread of missile technology to the hands of unpredictable leaders like Saddam—some other less unpresentable types like the Syrian Asad are still being watched—explains the persistence of the Condor case. The two missiles stored by the Air Force, plus the 12 other propulsion systems packed away somewhere in Argentina, still cause shivers of fear in the West.

#### 'Sell It to Libya'

"Are people interested in this?" asked Menem.

"Yes, a lot of people," boasted Crespo. "The Saudis, the Iranians, the Iraqis. We would have to change the guidance and control system, as they do not want an inertial device, but they are very interested. The Libyans also want to buy it, but this is sensitive equipment, and

they want to take part in the construction of the Condor or at least, they want us to sell it to them."

[Menem] And what might the price of the Condor be?

[Crespo] Let us say that it depends on what they think it may be worth, but more or less between \$300,000 and \$500,000.

[Menem] Then go ahead and sell it to Libya.

This conversation, reproduced in another chapter of "Carnal Relations," was witnessed by Julia and three other high-level Air Force officers. The place: the bunker at the El Chamical launch facility in La Rioja. The date: 5 July 1989, just three days before Menem would become the first chief of state in more than 60 years to receive the presidential sash from the hands of another elected president.

For Menem as he was at that time, the large-scale production and export of weapons was not incompatible with the Bunge and Born plan that proposed to get Argentina's economy moving. He wanted to compete on that terrain with Brazil, which had sold more than \$4 billion worth of weapons to Iraq in just a little more than eight years.

The first secretary of defense production in Menem's government, Colonel Jean Charles Uranga, who had come from the ranks of the nationalists, during the first months of the Menem administration promoted a military materiel production program with which he wanted to develop sales of close to \$1 billion a year. The revolution in production, he said, would have as its axis a renovated military industry. Menem did not dispute that.

Alfredo Carim Yoma, Menem's brother-in-law and in charge of the family's leather and hides business until 1989, was on the same wavelength as Uranga. Yoma moved up in the two fields he knew best: business and the Arab world.

From the Foreign Ministry's Department of Special Affairs, Yoma took charge of trade relations with Spain, Italy, and the Arab countries. From the beginning, his quite unorthodox style brought him into conflict with Cavallo, his nominal superior. In each dispute the new diplomat appealed for the intervention of his brother-in-law, the president.

Carim wanted to open up the borders of all the Arab countries, even those in the most volatile area of the Middle East. It made no difference to him whether he was selling arms, leather, or milk, and it was also a matter of indifference whether the buyers were Iranians or Iraqis. With a pragmatism worthy of a better cause, the secretary of special affairs had connections in Syria—the country he knew best, for obvious reasons—in Algeria, Iran, the United Arab Emirates, and Iraq.

From Alfredo Carim came an initiative that could have put Menem in a tight spot, especially in light of the clear position the president adopted in the war against Saddam.

During the first half of 1990, Yoma exchanged a series of notes with Baghdad related to the trip through the Middle East that his relative had planned for the first week of March 1991. The Menem-Saddam summit was thwarted by the Iraqi leader's strike at Kuwait.

Shortly before that, after a warning tip from Todman, Cavallo kept Menem from making a trip that would have sunk him irremediably in the sea of the losers, isolated from the allies against Saddam.

On 14 November 1989, an Argentine attorney named Roberto Negro signed a contract in the name of the Bremco company based in Liechtenstein. The agreement gave Negro extensive authority to negotiate with Iraq for the sale of Air Force materiel, including Condor missiles. The file spent two weeks on Menem's desk in his office in Government House. Yoma took it there, and from there Cavallo retrieved it. The final offensive against Condor II began, which could not keep two missiles from being hidden away in secret. And there is no doubt that a greater effort related to these "carnal relations" will

begin now. Such efforts seem to have been thwarted because, while governments may come and go, institutions remain.

#### Raising the Curtain

Reporters Eduardo Barcelona and Julio Villalonga are the authors of the book entitled "Carnal Relations: The True Story of the Construction and Destruction of the Condor II Missile" (published by Editorial Planeta). Barcelona is with the political section of the newspaper PAGINA 12, specializing in military issues. He is also a permanent correspondent for the INTERNATIONAL DEFENSE REVIEW, a highly prestigious periodical on military matters. Villalonga works for the Spanish news agency EFE and is a regular correspondent for a number of specialized publications in Europe and in the Americas, including SOMOS.

In "Carnal Relations," the authors manage to raise the heavy curtain shrouding Argentina's mysterious and bold attempt to enter the big-time market of arms deals that is monopolized by First World nations. But most of all, it is a straightforward description of the political and economic interests that have swirled around the doomed project. A project, as we know now, that has never found peace in its final resting place.

## IRAN

### UN Envoy Denies Reports on Nuclear Ambitions

NC0807060892 *Tehran Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran First Program Network in Persian* 0330 GMT  
8 Jul 92

[Text] Iran, which initiated the plan to abolish nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, has announced its readiness to implement this plan comprehensively with the participation of the United Nations.

Iran's permanent representative to the United Nations sent a letter to the UN secretary general yesterday in which he described reports on Iranian efforts to gain access to nuclear weapons as baseless, saying: Iran, as a signatory to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, maintains a peaceful nuclear research program under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA]. The letter says that Iran cooperates fully with the IAEA, and that this agency has confirmed that Iran is fulfilling its commitments. Then Iranian envoy added that IAEA inspections of Iranian nuclear research centers have not produced any evidence corroborating allegations by the mass media.

The letter then refers to the threatening remarks made by the Zionist regime's Air Force commander, saying: The Iranian Government denies reports that it is attempting to gain access to nuclear weapons, and stresses that it views defense against any possible adventurist aggression as its legitimate right.

In conclusion, the letter says: Iran announces its readiness to implement comprehensively the plan for Middle East nuclear disarmament, and considers the Zionist regime's nuclear programs—being pursued outside the framework of international regulations—to be a threat to regional stability.

### German Chemical Disarmament Request Supported

LD0707092892 *Tehran IRNA in English*  
0702 GMT 7 Jul 92

[Text] Tehran, July 7, IRNA—Iran has given a positive reply to a German request for supporting the chemical disarmament convention draft, on condition that it will not pose problems for the third world's economic and industrial programmes especially that of chemical industries.

This was announced during a meeting between Deputy Foreign Minister for International Affairs Manuchehr Mottaki and special envoy of the German Government Josif Holik here Monday.

Mottaki pledged that Iran as "a major victim of chemical weapons attack" after World War II will actively participate in preparation of the draft according to the Islamic principles of its foreign policy.

However, he remarked that the text and principles of the convention should be universal in application without any biased or discriminatory tendencies, and should also be supported by a surveillance system.

It is under such desirable conditions that observation of the principles of the convention can be ensured by all members, he said.

Holik conveyed a verbal message from German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel to Mottaki and praised Iran's active participation in codifying the draft convention in Geneva.

He also called for Tehran-Bonn cooperation in international fields.

The draft is expected to be handed over to the General Assembly of the United Nations for endorsement by all members during the current year.

Germany's Kinkel had earlier called for Iran's support for the draft in a written message to Foreign Minister 'Ali Akbar Velayati.

## IRAQ

### Agriculture Ministry Bars UN CW Inspectors

NC0707083892 *Paris AFP in English* 0828 GMT  
7 Jul 92

[Text] Baghdad, July 7 (AFP)—Iraqi officials defied a call from the Security Council on Tuesday and continued to bar a team of U.N. chemical weapons inspectors from searching the Agriculture Ministry here, an AFP correspondent reported.

An Iraqi official, who requested anonymity, said "the Iraqi position has not changed up to now."

The Security Council demanded Monday that Iraq immediately stop blocking the inspectors. The team of 16 chemical weapons experts were barred from entering the ministry on Sunday morning and have remained in place outside the building to monitor people leaving or entering.

Iraq says the visit would violate its sovereignty.

## PAKISTAN

### Official Notes Resolve Against Chemical Weapons

BK0507091592 *Islamabad Radio Pakistan Network in Urdu* 0200 GMT 5 Jul 92

[Text] Dr. (Josef Holleck), the commissioner of the German federal government on arms reduction and control, held talks with Foreign Affairs Secretary General Akram Zaki on the text of the draft on chemical weapons convention in Islamabad yesterday. Dr. (Holleck) is currently visiting Pakistan in connection with the ongoing Geneva meeting on imposing restrictions on

chemical weapons. The secretary general told Dr. (Holleck) that Pakistan wants an early settlement on the convention on chemical weapons. Akram Zaki emphasized that Pakistan does not possess chemical weapons, nor is it producing such a weapon. He categorically said that Pakistan is committed to a complete restriction on the production, stockpiling, or use of chemical weapons. The secretary general apprised the visitor of the regional situation as well as Pakistan's nuclear policy and its efforts for keeping South Asia free from nuclear weapons, especially the prime minister's proposal for a five-nation consultation in this regard.

#### Upgrade of Nuclear Reactor Detailed

92WP0235B Islamabad *THE MUSLIM* in English  
25 May 92 p 11

[Article by Mohammad Arshad: "Pakistan Research Reactor-1 and Its Upgradation"]

[Text] Pakistan Research Reactor-1 (PARR-1), installed at PINSTECH [Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology] near Islamabad, is a swimming pool type research reactor. It was supplied by American Machine Foundry (AMF) of USA. The reactor went critical in December 1965 and attained full power in June 1966. The availability of the reactor provided a starting point for the scientific and technical activities at the Institute. The completion of the reactor's 25 years of successful operation is an indication of the growth and consolidation of a number of research and production activities at PINSTECH. The reactor has been mainly used for research in areas such as nuclear physics and engineering, material science, production of radioisotopes and training of manpower.

The reactor originally designed for a thermal power of 5 MW, utilized Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) as fuel. Because of the non-availability of HEU, it was decided to redesign the core using Low Enriched Uranium (LEU). Simultaneously it was decided to replace aging control console and other major components to extend the life of the reactor by another 25 years or so. Based on these considerations, it was estimated that the power of the reactor could also be safely increased to about 10 MW.

The reactor core is immersed in a 10 meter deep water pool and is cooled and moderated by light water and reflected by light water and graphite. The shielding is provided by water, regular and heavy density concrete. Spanning the pool is a manually operated bridge, from which an aluminium tower supporting suspended [sentence as published]. Control of the reactor is accomplished by the insertion or withdrawal of neutron absorbing control rods which are installed in special fuel elements. Heat generated by nuclear chain reaction is dissipated by natural convection at low power levels (upto 100 KW) and through a forced circulation cooling system at higher power levels. Externally located pumps,

heat exchangers, cooling towers, demineralizers, water softeners and filters comprise the water handling system for the reactor.

Nuclear reactors are complex installations requiring very high standards of safety due to the dangerous radiation involved. The availability and safety of the reactor are dependent on proper maintenance of the equipment and instruments. The importance of proper maintenance was realised right from the beginning and an effective programme was implemented for this purpose. As a result PARR-1 has been operating very well and no untoward incident has occurred during the last 25 years.

Prior to the full scale redesigning and renovation of the entire reactor system, design and fabrication of instrumentation and controls of the reactor were carried out as early as 1986. The old system contained obsolete, tube type electronics posing problems in repair and maintenance. The instrumentation and control system was completely redone and replaced with solid state electronics. The new instrumentation was so designed that all the probable accident initiating parameters are adequately and reliably monitored. The number of channels for measuring neutron flux and process variables were increased in order to provide requisite redundancy and diversity. The scope of radiation measurement and monitoring was extended. A computer was interfaced with the new instrumentation for data acquisition, logging and analysis. A closed circuit TV system was installed for the surveillance of reactor core and building. Communication within the building and outside was improved.

Standard criteria for single failure, failsafe design, redundancy diversity were incorporated. Various systems were designed, tested, installed and commissioned entirely with local efforts and only some of the equipment was imported. The new instrumentation and control system installed in 1986, has been performing very well and the frequency of instrument related unscheduled reactor shutdowns has been negligible. This is particularly gratifying since the new instrumentation system. The new system was designed in such a way that reactor operators have little problem in changing over from the old to the new console. It has, therefore, shown to be user friendly.

The whole instrumentation was again reviewed before the core conversion and upgradation of power to 10 MW and additional measuring and monitoring capability was provided due to the enhanced power level.

For the redesign of the core, the reactor analysis expertise available with PAEC contributed effectively to compute the specification of the fuel elements and core configuration. The guiding considerations during the redesign were that existing mechanical and civil systems should be used with minimum possible alterations and the reactor shutdown period should be minimum.

To select appropriate design for PARR-1 standard and control fuel elements detailed neutronic analysis was carried out. For this purpose, the performance of several designs with different fuel types, fuel loadings and

number of fuel loadings and number of fuel plates was compared and selection was made in view of the specific requirements and constraints of PARR-1. The new LEU fuel for PARR-1 utilizes U<sub>3</sub>Si<sub>2</sub> with the Uranium enriched to 19.99 percent in U-235 compared with 93 percent enrichment of the previous fuel. New standard fuel elements have 23 fuel plates (the old elements had 16 fuel plates) and contain 290 grams of U-235 per element. After the final selection of the fuel element, detailed neutronic analysis for PARR-1 conversion and upgradation was performed. This included the analysis of various core configuration for different operations. The fuel cycle analysis for the first few years was also carried out. After finalizing the design of the fuel elements and reactor core, steady thermal-hydraulic analysis was carried out and the optimum power was determined. The criterion adopted should occur to the reactor system during any foreseeable mishap. Even in the case of a maximum credible accident, no significant radiation hazard should be posed to the general public. Analysis of various accident scenarios led to introduction of effective additional safety features, such as the emergency core coolant system, etc.

During the conversion and upgradation of PARR-1 certain obsolete and worn-out components were replaced and several new facilities and systems were added. The radioactive materials and irradiated fuel elements used to be stored in the reactor pool. As the inventory of such materials was gradually building-up, a storage bay was constructed. This facility is being used for the storage of irradiated fuel elements and other radioactive core components. It was found specially useful for the storage of spent fuel and active components from PARR-1 pool, which was emptied for stainless steel lining. A fuel transportation cash was designed and fabricated locally for transferring the radioactive fuel from reactor pool to the storage bay.

Seepage of water through the concrete walls is a generic problem of almost all the pool type reactors. At PARR-1 also it started soon after commissioning in 1965. In 1980, the reactor pool was repaired from the inside and outside. All the loose tiles were fixed where necessary and the concrete joints were repaired with quick setting water proofing cement and compounds. As a result, the seepage was controlled for some time, but it appeared again. Therefore, to solve this problem permanently, it was planned to line the entire pool with stainless steel. This effort required the removal of all reactor components and radioactive materials stored in the pool. It was a major effort and was undertaken under very difficult conditions without any foreign assistance.

The reactor building containment degraded gradually with time and then problems were faced in the maintenance of subatmospheric pressure. The weathering of exterior surface of the building was noticeable. Therefore, necessary civil repairs were carried out to make it leak-tight and withstand emergency conditions. The structural concrete of the dome was coated with fibre glass reinforced neoprene, followed by a thick layer of

insulating concrete blocks and finished with steel reinforced plaster, which was finally overlaid with a 3 mm thick fibre glass layer. Special attention was given to the elimination of cracks and sealing of all airlock doors, window frames, electrical, mechanical and other penetrations for ducts, piping and instrumentation cables. Inside the building, the condition of the old equipment for general services such as HVAC [expansion not given], electrical systems, diesel generator and compressor, etc. was very poor. These were replaced with new and improved equipment.

The cooling system of PARR-1 was modified to meet the requirements of upgraded power of 10 MW. Both primary and secondary cooling systems were redesigned and a major part of the piping was changed. A locally fabricated set of heat exchangers and additional pumps were installed and a new cooling tower was constructed. Two additional demineralizer units were installed. One of these is used for the makeup of water losses.

In order to ensure safety for the upgraded PARR-1 and to bring the reactor to the current safety standards, some additional safety systems have been provided. To reduce the radiation at the pool surface, a hot water layer system has been installed. This system provides protection against radioactive currents from the core during operation of the reactor.

An Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) has been installed to remove core decay heat in case of Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA). A set of spray headers and nozzles are mounted on the core support structure 1m above the normal pool level. The design is such that the ECCS will start spraying water in the core before its exposure to air so that fuel meltdown could be prevented.

Old PARR-1 partially decommissioned in November, 1990 to make preparations for the installation of upgraded LEU core. Simultaneously, work was started on renovation of various systems described above. The untiring efforts of PAEC scientists and engineers bore fruit and after about a year, the new fuel was loaded and the reactor became critical on October 31, 1991. Soon after this, low power experiments were performed on different core configurations. Initial tests and measurements indicated that various systems of the reactor performed according to the design specifications and most of the experimental results were in agreement with the theoretical design. After completion of the low power tests, a core for full power operation was assembled and in early May 1992, the reactor attained full power. Since, most of the old systems have been replaced with new and better equipment and stringent safety conditions have been employed.

**Russian Official Questions Accord With U.S.**

OW0207123392 Moscow *INTERFAX* in English  
1036 GMT 2 Jul 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The recent agreements between the presidents of the United States and Russia to reduce strategic offensive arms will "unequivocally result in an imbalance in interests of the powers in U.S. favour and will irreparably damage Russia's defence potential and national interests" - the vice-chairman of the Party of Constitutional Democrats Dmitriy Rogozin has told an IF [INTERFAX] correspondent.

Mr. Rogozin referred to an analysis drawn up by experts on possible effects from the implementation of the accords. The analysis notes that "when Russia reduces SS-18 missiles—the basic component of its strategic nuclear force—to zero by 2003, the U.S. will retain submarines with "Trident-2" missiles on board, capable of delivering strikes on CIS from all strategic directions". Experts regard as a rather complex problem the neutralization and utilization of nuclear warheads and the liquid fuel of missiles, which at a time of economic crisis in Russia will lead to multibillion spendings". With a radical reduction in the strategic offensive weaponry of the two super powers, experts add, their nuclear arsenals will become comparable with those of France and Britain, "however their missiles are least of all aimed at United States."

"The understandings in the form they now are unequivocally cannot be ratified by the RF [Russian Federation] Supreme Council"—the experts who prepared the analysis at the request of the Party of Constitutional Democrats conclude.

**Russia To Test 'Topaz-2' on U.S. Spacecraft**

LD0207101792 Moscow *Teleradiokompaniya Ostankino Television First Program Network*  
in Russian 1400 GMT 30 Jun 92

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] A plutonium reactor was shut down in Krasnoyarsk today. There are plans to close a second reactor by year's end. However, nuclear scientists are not wasting time. They are developing new nuclear installations—albeit for peaceful purposes—for space. We received this report from St. Petersburg today on Topaz-2, a unique installation developed in St. Petersburg:

[Begin recording] [Correspondent V. Batalov] Unfortunately, this unique nuclear power station has found no use in our country. This is why Topaz-2 is undergoing flight tests aboard a U.S. satellite to be launched into a near-Earth orbit soon. Solar batteries whose capacity and operating life are not particularly great are currently used on board spacecraft. Scientists at the central machine-building design bureau have harnessed the thermal energy of nuclear decay and turned it into electricity.

The miniature nuclear power station can ensure a stable yield of 5-7kW over seven years. About 20 models of Topaz have successfully undergone tests on Earth. However, the cutback in financing Russian scientists' projects means that U.S. scientists will carry out the space tests.

[V.P. Nikitin, not further identified] Great efforts and work have been put into developing this installation. There is a range of tasks which could be fulfilled using this installation for our country. Unfortunately, the conversion which has taken place and the lack of resources have not provided opportunities to make use of it in our country.

[Batalov] Nuclear power stations in space with a capacity of up to 50kw will be developed jointly with the United States based on Topaz-2. They will be applied not only on communications and telecommunications satellites but also may be used for flights to Mars and Venus. [end recording]

**Russian Security Halts Smuggling of Aluminum Pipes**

LD0207155792 Moscow *Radio Moscow World Service*  
in English 1500 GMT 2 Jul 92

[Text] The Russian Security Ministry and the Military Prosecutor's office have uncovered a major operation to smuggle strategic materials out of the country. The ITAR-TASS news agency says that at the last minute several trains were detained carrying about 30 million meters of aluminium pipes, estimated at 80 million rubles from Russia to Lithuania. Involved in the affair were a Moscow center for cultural ties, a cooperative in the Volga River area and authorities of an Army unit in Lithuania who concluded a fictitious lease contract in bypass of the Russian Ministry of External Economic Ties. The ministry has banned the export of nonferrous metals as strategic materials.

**Status of Arzamas-16 'Nuclear City' Debated**

LD0707150192 Moscow *Radio Rossi* Network  
in Russian 0700 GMT 7 Jul 92

[Text] For the first time in many decades efforts are being made to put in order the administrative and territorial status of the nuclear city of Arzamas-16. ITAR-TASS reports.

People's deputies, lawyers, and ecologists of the Mordovian SSR and Nizhniy Novgorod, as members of a special commission, are conducting the negotiations. The problem stems from the fact that the town was classified as secret in 1946 in connection with the setting up there of a nuclear military research center. At that time the well known city of (Sarov) vanished from the map of Mordovia. As an administrative unit it was transferred to what was then Gorkiy oblast. In doing so the issue of giving land to the city was not settled, something which has given risen to quite a few conflict situations.

In Mordovia a public movement has been set up for the return of the city's territory to the republic.

**'Asian Country' Recruiting Krasnoyarsk Scientists**

PM0307134392 Moscow *IZVESTIYA* in Russian  
27 Jun 92 Morning Edition p 7

[Report by Aleksey Tarasov: "Krasnoyarsk Counterintelligence Agents in the Hunt for Spies and Turncoats"]

[Text] The article entitled "Espionage Passions in Krasnoyarsk" (*IZVESTIYA* No 118) evoked a considerable reaction in the local Ministry of Security administration. What is more, the local outbreak of spy mania described by the newspaper also had a gripping sequel. Speaking on television, Anatoliy Samkov, chief of the Russian Ministry of Security Krasnoyarsk Administration, declared that he has information about attempts by a certain Asian country to recruit nuclear scientists. He did not say which country.

Our newspaper has already reported that there are nuclear enterprises in the closed cities of Krasnoyarsk-26 and Krasnoyarsk-45. Thousands of highly skilled specialists work at these enterprises. I will tell you immediately: These are not developers of nuclear programs, not top-secret physicists possessing nuclear "know-how" in general. In January representatives of these plants told *IZVESTIYA* (No 11) that rumors of a brain drain have nothing to do with them. But, at the same time, it is becoming increasingly hard to live in the closed taiga cities. Naturally, potential candidates for recruitment by Third World countries could feel tempted.

Then came Samkov's statement. It is truly sensational—after all, despite the hysteria surrounding the problem of the exodus of Russian "nuclear brains," no specific incidences of recruitment or of the receipt of such offers from abroad had yet been revealed. How have Krasnoyarsk's counterespionage services followed this up?

I managed to talk to Colonel Samkov, but only over the telephone. He refused to meet, saying that it was still too early to publicize the given information.

V. Lebedev, general director of the mining and chemical combine in Krasnoyarsk-26 (producing weapons-grade plutonium), advised us to ask Deputy Chief Engineer Yu. Revenko for details. I contacted him. "There is nothing secret about the foreign contacts about which you are enquiring," Revenko said. "The matter concerns an official delegation which came to us via the local administration." Nevertheless, he also refused to be more specific in his remarks. "Why, who needs this? Will it do Russia any good? I value our partners." Moreover, in his words, he personally has not been offered a specific job abroad and, as far as he is aware, the workers at the combine—those, of course, that he knows—are in the same position. Likewise, the managers of the electrochemical plant in Krasnoyarsk-45 (for enriching uranium) could neither firmly deny or confirm Samkov's statement.

Perhaps the kray administration knows something? Security Administration Chief I. Zhmakov said: No, I know nothing about this. However, there is evidence that foreigners are showing huge interest in the closed cities. There is a constant influx of letters requesting visits to these cities, including some from foreign military organizations.

Even I. Ogorodnikov, chairman of the Industry and Fuel and Energy Complex Committee, had no information on the transformation of nuclear scientists' intellect into a commodity for sale—and he works with nuclear enterprises constantly.

The circle is complete. However, shortly afterward, while questioning one of the kray deputies, I heard the following: Between \$20,000 and \$25,000 per month (? a huge sum of money!) was offered to our nuclear scientists recently... by the Chinese. Through private channels, they are allegedly looking for people to help modernize the uranium enrichment plant in Lanzhou. This enterprise was constructed with the help of Soviet specialists during the era of great friendship between our countries, and Soviet equipment is installed there. Furthermore, again through private channels, the Chinese side approached the plant in Krasnoyarsk-45 with an offer to purchase gas-diffusion filters—brand new ones, for which the Siberians have no use. According to information from this same source, the Chinese have also made several offers to the combine in Krasnoyarsk-26.

World unease is connected mainly with the fear that Russian weapons specialists could speed up the creation of an "Islamic" nuclear bomb. But you know, there are no "bomb-makers" in Krasnoyarsk! On the other hand, China—if, of course, Samkov's information on the intrigues of Chinese agents are true—is a country which, as we know, is a nuclear power.

From my own investigations and from conversations with nuclear scientists, I have established the following: Yes, it is possible that somebody is nurturing plans to head for the Middle East or the Libyan desert. Although there, you know, the problem is to create modern weapons. This is within the capabilities only of collectives of nuclear scientists. A mass exodus of Russian weapons specialists is unrealistic. The former "defense sector" elite's material situation has altered, but their mentality has not. They have not lost their sense of duty and patriotism, nor their frequently condescending attitude toward anything which does not concern their work. Our standards, whereby apparently we are all only too happy to sell everything, including ourselves, for hard currency, hardly apply to these people: The mentality here is quite special—for instance, the inhabitants of the closed cities are categorically opposed to opening them up, they are afraid of losing the barbed wire that surrounds them. Where would such people go?

In general, the story surrounding the sensational statement by the Russian Ministry of Security Krasnoyarsk Administration chief becomes clearer if we recall his

latest "public" appearances. For example, in an interview with KRASNOYARSKIY RABOCHIY [Krasnoyarsk Worker] and at a press conference, he spoke of a visit to the city on the Yenisey by two Englishmen who introduced themselves as officials from the embassy. Samkov believes they were intelligence officers. What form did their intelligence activity take? Apparently, in his words, they took political soundings and met with political leaders. Obviously, it never occurred to the chief of the special service organs that this constitutes the day-to-day work of diplomats, journalists, political experts, and so on. Or could it be that the failure to distinguish between gathering information and probing for secrets was deliberate, and carefully calculated?

Inspired by earlier observations in *IZVESTIYA* regarding spy mania in the Siberian heartland, Marcus Warren, correspondent from the DAILY TELEGRAPH, flew to Krasnoyarsk—naturally, he was bound to be interested in the "discovery" of English spies here. Marcus asked me beforehand to arrange a meeting for him with Samkov, which I tried to do. It emerged that the *IZVESTIYA* article had caused some unpleasantness at work for Anatoliy Petrovich, however—his days off had been cancelled.

After spending several days in the city on the Yenisey, Marcus had managed merely to look at the outside of the "gray house"—the special services building. None of the Russian Ministry of Security Administration officials had received him. Not even the chief of the press service. Actually, there is nothing surprising in this—according to accounts from colleagues, the CIA is none too keen on foreign journalists either. What is interesting, however, are the reasons which a security organs representative gave me when asked why a meeting was impossible. First, this English journalist could also be an intelligence agent, and second, he would naturally want to know why two of his compatriots were deemed to be spies—"So why unleash international scandals?"

In general, it seems, Samkov said too much. At any rate about English agents. Although not only about them, it seems. The air force attache from the Canadian Embassy and assistant air force attache from the U.S. Embassy came to Krasnoyarsk and met with representatives of the kray administration. They asked about the development of market relations and the progress of privatization. They gave an interview to Krasnoyarsk television. A few minutes after the item was broadcast on local television, Samkov declared that the so-called attaches are intelligence agents and that they had been to Krasnoyarsk before (prior to this, one of the guests had said that he was happy to be visiting Krasnoyarsk for the second time).

Incidentally, Marcus explained: The main reason for the visit by the Englishmen whom the valiant security officers "exposed" was not the Siberian congress but the international conference on conversion held in Krasnoyarsk a few days before the deputies' forum. The Englishmen had contributed \$80,000 to holding this

conference, which looked at opportunities for foreign aid for enterprises undergoing conversion.

Indeed, the state security organs move in mysterious ways....

### Krasnoyarsk-26 Plutonium Reactors Shut Down

PM0607141992 Moscow *IZVESTIYA* in Russian  
1 Jul 92 Morning Edition p 2

[Report by Aleksey Tarasov: "In Secret Caverns of Krasnoyarsk-26 Reactor Which Produced Weapons-Grade Plutonium Has Been Shut Down"]

[Text] A historic event took place on the morning of 30 June in the closed Siberian city of Krasnoyarsk-26. At the Mining and Chemical Combine here, deep below ground, the AD Reactor, which since 1958 has been producing weapons-grade plutonium—the material used to fill nuclear weapons—was halted.

The board of Russia's State Committee for the Supervision of Nuclear and Radiation Safety has resolved to halt not only the AD reactor but also—as early as September—its counterpart, the ADE-1 reactor, which serves the very same purpose. This pace does not suit the mining and chemical plant leadership. The nuclear scientists were hoping for a gap of one to one and a half years between the closure of the reactors—this, in their opinion, would allow them to reduce the combine's losses, avoid social upheaval, and gradually find employment for all the workers. Let me remind you that we are talking about an 11,000-strong collective.

There is no doubt that the mining and chemical combine is precisely the kind of "defense sector" unit which should be among the first to halt its current activity, and it is here that our modern ideals should be demonstrated to the world. It would be senseless to go on producing huge quantities of plutonium for a further year. Likewise, it would be senseless to continue pumping a hot radionuclide-contaminated stream into the Yenisey—the reactors being shut down are of the continuous flow-type which take water from the river to cool the reactor's core before pumping it back into the Yenisey.

While recognizing the need, however, it is also vital to acknowledge that a collective of highly skilled specialists—capable, of course, of working not only for war—could become one of the first sacrifices to the ending of the cold war, a unique kind of peace offering. The combine has been refused financial aid from the federal budget to help with losses incurred by the change of deadlines for shutting down the reactors.

Naturally, certain conversion projects are already being implemented, but they do not resolve the problems for such a monster as this. To all intents and purposes the state is forcing the Siberian weapons manufacturers to make the best of things, and to act as they think fit. Hence, their South Korean colleagues have appeared on the horizon, offering to provide storage for the spent

nuclear fuel from the mining and chemical combine's installations (see *IZVESTIYA* Nos. 8 and 9). There is no certainty that tomorrow will not bring an even more bizarre recipe for survival.

Today, all of this is being widely discussed by an alarmed public, although through the efforts of Krasnoyarsk's "Greens" the controversy is often reduced either to the question of whether we will be irradiated or blown up, or to thoughts on the subject of what we value most—green dollar bills, or the living greenery of the taiga. As a sign of protest against the import of Korean equipment and the mining and chemical combine's plans to finish a plant for regenerating spent nuclear fuel (RT-2), a representative of the local ecology movement committed an act of "symbolic self-immolation": He fettered himself to a bus stop opposite the city soviet building with heated chains. The guardians of the forests and rivers, whom it would be more precise to call "ultra-Greens," informed the authorities that "they are calling on Krasnoyarsk Kray to stage a general ecological strike, switching ultimately to an indefinite strike." The population's reaction to the call has been extremely apathetic, however.

...The first plant for regenerating spent nuclear fuel was constructed in the southern Urals. It services water-cooled, water-moderated VVER-440 reactors. Likewise, the RT-2 was devised to reprocess spent nuclear fuel.

I am convinced that the state should acknowledge its responsibility for the fate of specialists at the mining and chemical combine and that it should not force them to seek material support from the Koreans. It is vital to define prospects for developing the nuclear sector as a whole and to act with the combine in line with the planned strategy.

#### Storage To Take Six Months

PM0307132592 Moscow Russian Television Network  
in Russian 1600 GMT 30 Jun 92

[From the "Vesti" newscast: Video report by G. Nikolayev and Yu. Suetov, figures in brackets denote broadcast time in GMT in hours, minutes, and seconds]

[Text] [161751] [Nikolayev] This is the reactor hall at the Krasnoyarsk-26 Mining and Chemical Combine. A holy of holies where outsiders were never admitted, because for 30 years weapons-grade plutonium was produced here. But today, 30 June, the reactor is being shut down. Admittedly, though, nuclear fuel will be being removed from the reactor and sent for storage and reprocessing for another six months yet. The reactor will remain dangerous for decades to come.

[Unidentified man] We are standing on a seven-meter-thick containment structure. It allows personnel to work here without receiving dangerous doses. The people who work in this specific area are exposed to the most radiation—1.5-2 rems a year. In other words, around one-half what health regulations permit.

[Nikolayev] During my 90 minutes in the reactor hall I was exposed, experts tell me, to one-thousandth of a roentgen—or less than 4 percent of the normal amount of radiation per shift.

#### Ukraine Trains Inspectors for Weapons Destruction

LD0407070692 Kiev UKRINFORM in Russian  
1939 GMT 2 Jul 92

[ "While Getting Ready To Implement the Treaties"—  
UKRINFORM headline]

[Text] [No dateline as received]—In order to implement the treaties on the reduction and restriction of weapons and personnel, there is to be mutual inspection activity of the states participating in the treaties. With the objective of qualitative preparation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine for the treaties' implementation, the training of inspectors, observers, and specialists to accompany foreign inspection groups has been organized on the basis of some military schools. Practical training of specialists in liquidation and requalification of weapons will be carried out at the reduction sites for requalification (certification) of weapons and military machinery.

#### Reports on Ukraine's Nuclear Status, Plans

##### Kravchuk Defines Position

LD0607125892

[Text] Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian at 1205 GMT on 6 July, during its regularly scheduled "Panorama" program, carries a live 10-minute report by correspondent Aleksandr Ruvinskiy from the CIS heads of state summit at Moscow's President Hotel Reception is good.

Ruvinskiy begins by reviewing developments at the summit covered by refs. He then takes a moment to point out: "The issue of ways to warn of a missile attack and to monitor space was resolved. By all accounts, summit participants have switched to military issues. It became clear at the recent defense ministers conference that certain disagreements were evident, specifically involving Ukraine and control of strategic nuclear forces. I met Leonid Kravchuk at the airport this morning. He addressed correspondents on Ukraine's stand on this matter, saying that he feels that Ukraine should retain administrative control and that the CIS command should retain operational control. As far as I understand it, this does not completely correspond to previous accords."

At 1215 GMT, Ruvinskiy concludes by noting that he will continue to update listeners on summit development throughout the day.

### To Keep Nuclear Warheads

OW0607210392 Moscow *INTERFAX* in English  
1833 GMT 6 Jul 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Ukraine insists on keeping nuclear warheads in assembly with the delivery vehicles deployed on its territory, largely because it has no confidence in Marshal Shaposhnikov's statements", [quotation mark as received] the Ukrainian Deputy Defence Minister Ivan Buzhan has told IF [INTERFAX]. "We have been offered to replace those warheads with non-nuclear equivalents", Buzhan said. "However it is quite clear that there are not enough equivalents for all missiles. [quotation mark as received] Without them the delivery vehicles may become dangerous.

Ivan Buzhan explained his doubts by the fact that six months ago in Alma-Ata the Council of the Heads of State and government asked the CIS Commander-in-Chief Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov to provide the Ukrainian President with the technical means to block the use of nuclear arms. "Shaposhnikov said he would do that, but has failed to do anything to this date", Buzhan said. Moreover, he claims that this is impossible. For that reason we want a comprehensive and consistent settlement of the problem, the more so since this does not disagree with the START-2 treaty.

Asked about what made Ukraine change its position after it had already announced it was going to remove all nuclear arms from its territory by 1994, Ivan Buzhan said: "Our experts have studied the technical aspects of the problem and found that it cannot be done sooner than seven years".

About another proposal from the CIS allied command for cancelling the targeting of the missiles Ivan Buzhan said it was none of Ukraine's problem, but if that could be done, Ukraine would have nothing against.

### CIS Ministers on Ukraine's Nuclear Status

#### Shaposhnikov Opens Session

PM0607104792 Moscow *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA*  
in Russian 4 Jul 92 p 1

[Report by correspondent Colonel O. Falichev: "At the Final Hour: Military Delegations First To Meet"]

[Text] A session of the CIS Defense Ministers Council began as scheduled at 1000 hours at the CIS Joint Armed Forces Main Staff. It was opened by Marshal of Aviation Ye. Shaposhnikov, commander in chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces.

The session examined questions pertaining to the air defense system; the early-warning and space control systems; clarification of the composition of the Strategic Forces; the Collective Security Council; organization of

the activity of the CIS Joint Armed Forces High Command; the fundamental principles of CIS military doctrine and nuclear strategy; the results of the work carried out by leaders of cadre organs, etc.

Colonel General Boris Pyankov, deputy commander in chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces, told journalists at the end of the CIS Defense Ministers Council session that all the documents scheduled for consideration were approved today with minor amendments. The only question on which agreement was not reached was that of the status and form of control to be applied to the strategic forces deployed on Ukrainian territory.

Boris Pyankov sharply criticized the Ukrainian stance on this issue. "Today we suggested removing nuclear warheads from the strategic missiles deployed there or removing the onboard computers' flight plans [karty poletnykh zadaniy]," he said. "That would turn the missiles into fuel drums. There would no longer be any talk of the Ukraine's status as a nuclear power. The Ukrainian side is rejecting the possibility of these steps being taken and is still maneuvering, however. Ukraine's reluctance to hand over the Strategic Nuclear Forces entirely to the control of Russia and the CIS Joint Armed Forces High Command is also eliciting objections from Kazakhstan and Belarus, which have already taken this step."

#### Pyankov Criticizes Ukraine

LD0307114692 Moscow *ITAR-TASS* in English  
1121 GMT 3 Jul 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Andrey Naryshkin]

[Text] Moscow July 3 TASS—CIS defence ministers approved with inconsiderable amendments all documents included in the agenda of the meeting in Moscow on Friday, except the problem of strategic forces deployed in Ukraine. CIS First Deputy Commander Boris Pyankov told reporters after the meeting.

Pyankov bitterly criticised the Ukrainian stance on the matter. "Today we proposed to decommission nuclear warheads from strategic missiles deployed in Ukraine, or to delete the flight maps from onboard computers. This would turn the missiles into cans with fuel. There would be no necessity to speak about the nuclear status of Ukraine. However, the Ukrainian side rejects the proposals and continues to manoeuvre. The Ukrainian refusal to transfer strategic nuclear forces under complete control of Russia and the CIS Armed Forces main command is objected by Kazakhstan and Belarus which had already made the move", he explained.

Among other issues discussed at the meeting were the draft agreements on early warning systems and control of space and on organisational activity of the CIS Armed Forces Main Command.

**General Staff Concerned**

LD0707050992 Moscow Radio Rossiya Network  
in Russian 0300 GMT 7 Jul 92

[Text] Ukraine's nuclear status remains unclear for the time being. Ukraine's Defense Minister Konstantin Morozov maintains that the republic adheres to non-nuclear principles. The NEGA News Agency reports, however, that the General Staff of the CIS troops believes that Ukraine is violating the Lisbon protocol. Having signed the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons as a nuclear-free state, the republic announced its administrative control over the strategic arms stationed on Ukrainian territory. In the general staff's view, this means that Ukraine will be a nuclear proprietor for seven years. After discussing this problem at the Moscow summit, leaders of Ukraine, Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan agreed to start talks on implementing the Lisbon accord.

**CIS Insists on United Control**

OW0307104392 Moscow INTERFAX in English  
0959 GMT 3 Jul 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Commander-in-Chief of the CIS Joint forces Marshall Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov declared on the necessity to develop a mechanism for dividing the powers between the Main Committee of the CIS Joint forces and the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense. In particular, it concerns the nuclear forces stationed on the Ukrainian territory, he said during a conversation with "IF" [INTERFAX] before the session of the CIS Defense Ministers' Council in Moscow.

Shaposhnikov noted that the current position of Kiev in respect to this question may cause a misunderstanding on the part of Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Russia. According to Shaposhnikov, if the problem is not solved then "Ukraine must announce that it will be a nuclear power and to solve this issue at the level of the international community".

Meanwhile the first deputy of the Ukrainian Defense Minister General Ivan Pizza told "IF" that during his meeting with Marshall Shaposhnikov on the eve of the session of the CIS Defense Ministers' Council on July 3 they discussed a draft agreement on the strategic nuclear forces stationed on the Ukrainian territory. The document also defines the state legal status of the servicemen of the strategic forces on the Ukrainian territory.

Pizza was satisfied with the outcome of the meeting "as we managed to find a compromise satisfying both parties". "We agree that there must be a united control over the nuclear weapons", he noted.

**'Common Goal' Stressed**

LD0607173292 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English  
1725 GMT 6 Jul 92

[By ITAR-TASS]

[Excerpts] Moscow July 6 TASS—[passage omitted] The leaders of the four states were asked about the future of the strategic forces. Stanislav Shushkevich said a decision was adopted on Monday to immediately begin talks between the four states.

"We believe one of these states, Russia, should be a nuclear state and all agree to it," Shushkevich said.

The presidents of Ukraine and Kazakhstan agreed to the words of the Belarusian leader.

Leonid Kravchuk merely added that new approaches were found at today's meeting and the common goal of nuclear states of the Commonwealth is to find corresponding solutions taking into account the interests of these states and the world community.

Boris Yeltsin, touching upon the issue, recalled that the foreign ministers of the four CIS nuclear states had signed a Lisbon protocol, and a political decision was adopted in Moscow to immediately begin negotiations at the level of the heads of state for the implementation of the protocol.

**Military Experts Pessimistic**

OW0607210492 Moscow INTERFAX in English  
1833 GMT 6 Jul 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Behind the scenes of the Moscow CIS summit senior Russian Military experts have been saying they are pessimistic about the possibility of coordinated control of strategic nuclear arms. They say that Ukraine's position on that issue leaves no hope that the nuclear forces deployed on its territory can be jointly controlled. The experts say that this is nothing but Ukraine's intention to remain a nuclear power despite its pronounced commitment to its intention to go nuclear-free.

Experts from the General Staff of the Russian armed forces recall that the CIS Defence Ministers' conference was offered three options: the withdrawal of all nuclear warheads from Ukraine and their subsequent elimination; the replacement of the warheads with simulators; the simple dismantling of the warheads from the delivery vehicles and their keeping at Ukrainian bases. All the three proposals were rejected. Russian experts have blamed that on the "lack of goodwill". President Leonid Kravchuk said on Monday that the principle of Ukraine's administrative control of strategic nuclear arms on its territory remained unchanged.

The Russian military experts say this places Russia in a very difficult position, for it is the depository country of

the nuclear arms non-proliferation treaty. Any agreements that implement that treaty partially put Russia itself in the position of its abuser. The experts have described as a stumbling block President Yeltsin's April decree N 209, which in effect placed strategic offensive arms in Ukraine under his control. The Russian experts say this is a legal trap.

### Byelarus' Non-Proliferation Plans Reviewed

#### Kravchenko Meets U.S. Official

OW0207184892 Moscow INTERFAX in English  
1615 GMT 2 Jul 92

[Prepared by Andrey Pershin, Andrey Petrovskiy, and Vladimir Shishlin; edited by Boris Grishchenko; from "Presidential Bulletin"; transmitted via KYODO]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] The Foreign Minister of Byelarus, Mr Peter Kravchenko, has met today with the US Assistant Secretary of State Richard Kazlarich [name as received] who is responsible for relations with Byelarus. Their discussion focused on matters related to ratification by Byelarus of treaties on conventional armed forces in Europe, on strategic offensive weapons and on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Mr Kravchenko told his American counterpart that these issues are on the agenda of the next session of the republic's parliament and expressed confidence that the Supreme Soviet would ratify these treaties.

#### Stresses Nuclear-Free Aim

LD3006191992 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English  
1909 GMT 30 Jun 92

[By BELTA-TASS correspondent Tatyana Khryapina]

[Text] Minsk June 30 TASS—Byelarus is ready to join the treaty on conventional arms cuts in Europe, Byelarussian Foreign Minister Peter Kravchenko said on Tuesday.

Kravchenko expressed confidence that the Byelarussian parliament will ratify the treaty this autumn.

He stressed Byelarus aims to become a nuclear-free and neutral state. It has already withdrawn all tactical nuclear weapons from its territory and is now beginning to dismantle strategic nuclear arms. The republic plans to complete the withdrawal in seven years, Kravchenko said.

#### Notes Plan To Scrap N-Arms

LD0107131492 Moscow Russian Television Network  
in Russian 1000 GMT 1 Jul 92

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] Byelarus intends to sign a treaty on reduction of conventional weapons. Kravchenko, the foreign minister of the republic, has said that his country intends to scrap

all nuclear weapons. Tactical weapons have already been withdrawn from Byelarus. As for strategic weapons, they will be dismantled in the next seven years.

#### Defense Official Questions Withdrawal

OW0107201392 Moscow INTERFAX in English  
1900 GMT 1 Jul 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Deputy Defense Minister of Byelarus Colonel General Pyotr Chaus questions the need to set definite a time period for the withdrawal of strategic nuclear weapons from the republic and "considering the touchy political situation in the world" questions the need to withdraw them "in the near future". In an interview with "IF" [INTERFAX] Chaus said: "There are not any nations in the world who would not like to have nuclear weapons. Quite the contrary, they are all trying to get them".

#### Security Council AVOIDS Decision

OW0207202792 Moscow INTERFAX in English  
1830 GMT 2 Jul 92

[Transmitted via KYODO]

[Excerpts] The Security Council of Belarus held its first session in Minsk Thursday; the session was chaired by the Speaker of the Byelarussian Parliament Stanislav Shushkevich. The council is made up of: the chairman of the Parliament, his first deputy, the chairman of the parliamentary committee on national security, defense, and the fight against crime, and a number of leaders of ministries and departments. In peacetime the government organ can introduce various proposals to the parliament, and in wartime automatically becomes the Defense Council of Byelarus and governs the republic.

In extremely secure conditions the Security Council discussed the national security policy and a draft of the Byelarussian military doctrine. The members of the council attempted to coordinate these matters and strengthen them legislatively with the republic's aim to become a nuclear free state. [passage omitted]

The withdrawal of strategic nuclear weapons from Byelarus was also discussed. However, no decisions were made by the Security Council.

#### Anthrax 'Epidemic' Linked to 'Biological War'

927C0441 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA  
in Russian 10 Jun 92 p 1

[Article by K. Belyaninov, V. Nedogonov, V. Umnov, V. Chelikov, Sverdlovsk Oblast, under the rubric "KP (KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA) Investigation": "If You Find Me Unconscious, Please Report It to the City of Sverdlovsk...": Our Expedition Tracked the Clues of a Secret Biological War"]

[Text] On 1 May, as prescribed, the table was set. Klimov hadn't gotten through the first cup when two orderlies arrived.

"Have you drunk it all?"

"No," Klimov answered honestly.

And they took him away in the ambulance.

He had been expecting their arrival for almost a month—when his acquaintances began dying. Prokhorov died, and then Lozhkin, and then Romanov. People were dying on the trolleys and in doorways.

After comparing the facts, Klimov understood that he himself was the next candidate for the grave. It was taking those who lived or worked in Chkalovsk Rayon, near Military Base No. 19. In early April, Klimov went through military courses in a neighboring unit.

On 1 May 1979, he was vaccinated for anthrax. The physicians warned him that there could be complications: convulsions, cardiovascular disturbances, and even anaphylactic shock. In his passport, Vladimir Mikhaylovich wrote a note that he thought up right then and there: "If you find me unconscious, please report it to the city of Sverdlovsk, at this address..."

In the spring of 1979, in the CPSU Sverdlovsk Oblast Committee, an unhealthy situation developed. Alarming rumors about an epidemic were going through the corridors and smoking areas. When the alarm reached its apogee, the staff put together an address for First Secretary B. N. Yeltsin, so that he could inform the public.

Yeltsin agreed, and he set a date for a staff meeting.

On the appointed day, at the large oblast committee concourse, Boris Nikolayevich, trying not to stray from the paper, read a report from the rostrum about how in Sysertsk Rayon, a cow and a sheep infected with anthrax had been butchered and sold on the market, and that's how the epidemic had begun.

After he finished reading, he looked around the hall and said, "Any questions?"

The first secretary always proposed that questions be raised after his speeches, but he always remembered, long after, who it was who had raised the questions. So there weren't any questions. Everyone dispersed, grown quiet and even more frightened.

He went to Base No. 19, but they wouldn't even let him into the supersecret area. Boris Nikolayevich, by his own words, didn't know what was going on there. "It didn't have anything to do with me," he later said, "but I knew there was something there. And that's all. But when the epidemic broke out, I saw to it that it was taken care of right away."

The illness developed too quickly for the official "isolated cases." And it was strange that the anthrax appeared in the spring, when the snow was on the

ground, instead of the usual time—in the summer heat. According to the official data, 64 people died (now, by the way, related deaths are being announced, and the names of those people are not on the list that came out of the depths of the UKGB in December of just last year after inquiries by people's deputies.) Since then, only a few cases of anthrax have been recorded in Sverdlovsk Oblast.

"There are no documents whatsoever in the archives of our directorate, and never have been," said Dmitriy Kondratyev, deputy director of the oblast directorate of the Ministry of Security, who with that wiped away half of our questions. "The Chekas were in fact brought in to investigate the causes of the epidemic, but we didn't find anything substantial."

A number of detailed versions about the epidemic have sprung up. The first was that it was a terrorist act. No saboteurs, of course, were found; but at any rate they sent some American student—how he got there no one knows—out of Sverdlovsk. The student later wrote a "whole book" about the anthrax.

A second version was that the illness was "sent in" with imported equipment. Such things happened, in the words of Kondratyev, rather frequently. They would check the lathes that came into a plant, and they would find antisoviet literature or bags of gum. And once, in a railcar with Canadian wheat, they found a box, and in the box were strange ampules. It wasn't until about two weeks later that they figured out that they were rat poison...

When the official Moscow commissions confirmed that the source of the epidemic was infected meat, the people in the UKGB calmed down.

"According to the data of intelligence agencies and the testimony of individuals who emigrated from the Soviet Union, the outbreak occurred early on the morning of 3 April 1979 in the military Base No. 19 (?—Ed.). A cloud of spores went up into the air... The wind took the aerosol cloud to the south, which was lucky—otherwise, 1000 residents could have perished." (New Scientist, 1980)

Stanislav Alekseyev, head of the Center for Documentation of Public Organizations (formerly the oblast party archives), could barely find a hint of the anthrax in the documents of the oblast committee. Back in those days, the bureau met twice a month. In April 1979, the priority issues were things like statistical reports, the preparations for the plenum of the oblast committee of the All-Union Young Communist League, and the presentation of awards for "Active Propaganda of Marxism-Leninism."

In May, there was a seminar of first secretaries of rayon committees about people's control...

Not a word anywhere about the anthrax.

"Any record had to go through the head of the protocol department on its way to the archives," Alekseyev explained now. "Part of his job was to screen out the most secret matters, and only he could carefully pull out a page or two from the folder. If, indeed, such a record existed at all."

Yeltsin, as his former colleagues recall, didn't like paperwork.

Nevertheless, in 1979, there was an individual living in Sverdlovsk who wasn't very afraid of what was going on. His name was Aleksandr Karenin. Seeing everyone rushing around the city, he recalled the summer of 1969, the sunburnt steppe, an island lost in the Aral Sea.

Karenin served on the island of Vozrozhdeniye—the only biological testing ground in the homeland. The job of the sergeant of the CW defense troops was very simple: deliver a vehicle carrying horses to the testing ground, and then don a gas mask and wait in the vehicle's cabin for the "article" [vehicle] to be "attacked." When the cloud had passed, he would take the horses to a unit to die, and then scientists—including some from Sverdlovsk—would take over.

Sheep were brought to the testing ground in boxes: a special opening kept them from hiding their heads, and the calculations of the specialists were based on the notion that the sheep would inhale as much of the material as possible. There were also monkeys on the island, although Karenin, quite honestly, didn't see them. They weren't brought to the testing ground—they were sprayed with something right in the laboratories. The monkeys lived in style on the island: It cost 4 rubles 80 copecks a day to keep them there. It cost only 1 ruble 24 copecks to keep Karenin. But he and the other soldiers didn't complain about serving there. They would occasionally have shashlik from a sheep who hadn't been "gassed," and some soldiers weren't even squeamish about contaminated animals.

It wasn't until 10 years later that Karenin spoke about his service—in 1979. With the only difference that now people are playing the role of the horses.

The **frontline physician** Nikolay Babich reached Prague in 1945. He greeted the spring of 1979 holding the rank of a medical general—the head of an oblast health department. But that April, he, like Karenin, felt like a private.

The anthrax outbreak was a sneak attack. The first corpses came in quickly, but the doctors were very slow—it took three days for an accurate diagnosis, and then they waited for enough vaccine to come from Georgia...

In his pocket, Nikolay Stepanovich [Babich] carried a piece of paper folded like an accordian, on which he wrote the new addresses of the anthrax. He traced the flows of sick people.

The dead, for lack of a crematorium, were buried in the clay soil of the Vostochnaya Cemetery, sprinkled on all sides with calcium hypochlorite. On paper, thousands of people were said to have been vaccinated with anthrax vaccine; word of mouth, however, put the figure at hundreds of thousands.

The USSR chief state health physician, P. Burgasov, came tearing into Sverdlovsk. He didn't rush to Base No. 19—people were surprised, not knowing that in the summer he was to fly to a congress in India, and all he would have to do would be to take one step into the secret area, and he would immediately be confined to the place.

Burgasov headed a commission of civilian medical people.

A second commission consisted of military medical people. It was directed by Ye. Smirnov, the chief of the Main Military Medical Directorate of the Ministry of Defense.

A third commission—headed by the first deputy Andropov—also didn't leave any visible clues.

A fourth commission was an oblast epidemic-control commission.

Every morning, a cavalcade of black Volgas would roll up to the oblast health department building (so many that the chiefs were eventually asked to ride several to a car, so as not to create a traffic jam in the narrow lane). But Base No. 19 kept silent. Were there sick people there? One night, Babich and Burgasov stole up to the fence around the post and took samples of the run-off water. They didn't find any anthrax, but then they themselves were "exposed"—the next day, a "well-wisher" showed Babich photographs of the nighttime sortie.

While the commissions of Burgasov and Smirnov were writing their secret reports, urgent telegrams were coming from Moscow. At first, they ordered the roofs washed—so they were washed. If the agent was there, it would run off onto the asphalt with the water.

After a few days, a telegram came saying change the soap, put down new asphalt, and remove the upper layer of soil. After that, they gave up on it.

Many of those who arrived rushed into the wards to the patients—they were collecting material for their dissertations. That's when the order came down from the center: no one is to be admitted.

As Nikolay Babich learned many years later, a unique brochure appeared on saving people from mass infection with the anthrax. It appeared alright, but only in manuscript, because the author didn't live to see it come out—the brochure was banned.

Only the epidemic-control commission of the oblast executive committee worked in the open—it was looking

for contaminated meat in the Sysertsik Rayon, which is 40 kilometers south of Sverdlovsk. Everyday, the physicians of the oblast health-epidemiological station went out to the neighboring livestock burial grounds in search of the anthrax agent.

But the chief of the oblast UKGB showed up with a pistol and two strong guys with handcuffs in the office of the head of the oblast health department. They hauled out every single history of the disease, diaries, maps, and reports on the anthrax from the safe and put them into bags. For a finale, they even stuck the "accordian fold" from Nikolay Stepanovich's pocket into a bag.

Two month's of work and the unique training associated with saving hopeless patients (they had managed, after all, to pull several people out of it!) were forever buried in the entrails of the KGB.

Now the retired Nikolay Stepanovich Babich recalls with a smile how on the third day of the epidemic, at some meeting, a military commander suggested putting Babich in jail—"He overlooked the signs of the epidemic!"—and the second secretary of the oblast committee stamped his feet and threatened a trial.

Babich knew that that was no real threat to him at all.

It's instructive that although there was an epidemic of anthrax, not a single physician or epidemiologist (all of whom worked truly courageously, under the most difficult of conditions) was dismissed, and no reprimands or penalties were made. It was obvious that the epidemic was not their fault.

In July, a secret order came down: Forget the anthrax. They say that the anthrax story came to light at the SALT-I talks with the United States, and the Americans expressed their displeasure to Gromyko.

And when Nikolay Stepanovich Babich flew to the Black Sea to rest, people were curious and would ask, "What happened there?" And he would reply, "Nothing."

*To the state advisor of the Russian Federation on Ecology and Health Care, A. Yablokov:*

*In reference to the inquiries by the deputies of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR... The materials of the investigation of the epidemic outbreak of the illness were of a "Top Secret" nature. For that reason, no official information has come concerning the causes of its occurrence, the number of individuals infected, or the number of people who died. All the records of the laboratory tests of the environmental samples and of the materials from the infected individuals and those who died that were kept by the laboratories of the Sverdlovsk Oblast health-epidemiological service were confiscated by the KGB and the military procurator's office, as were the epidemiological analyses that were done afterward.*

*The RSFSR State Committee for Health and Epidemiological Inspection does not at present have any official documents on the causes or the extent of the tragedy.*

*Ye. N. Belyayev, Chairman  
November 1991*

"We didn't destroy any documents," Dmitriy Kondratyev, the deputy chief of the Yekaterinburg Directorate of the Ministry of Security, assured me in May 1992. "We don't even have furnaces for that kind of thing in the directorate. We never had those documents at all."

Six months ago, presidential advisor Aleksey Yablokov telephoned the chairman of the KGB, V. Bakatin.

"The president is getting ready to investigate the causes of the anthrax outbreak in Sverdlovsk. He needs the archive documents."

"We'll find them by this evening," Bakatin promised.

But two days went by, and no news came out of the committee. On the third day, Yablokov himself telephoned.

"I can't do anything with my subordinates," Bakatin complained. "They can't find anything."

Several days later, the chief of the center for social relations of the KGB went to Yablokov. He brought a thick folder of documents stamped "Secret." It contained the reports of the Burgasov commission, with a detailed elaboration of the official meat version.

"Look them over carefully," the visitor advised. "There's something in those documents that will shed light on the truth. Our staff members back then let something slip by. Here, for example: in smears taken from a rug and a wall mailbox, the anthrax agent was found. If the source were meat, the agent wouldn't ever have been found on household items."

Recalling that strange visit, the head of the organization department of Yablokov's office, S. Revina is certain of this:

"He clearly read the real documents just before coming to us. For no reason at all, he suddenly conjectured that the source of the illness was cracks in the ventilation filters of some "classified enterprise." He said that in the spring of 1979, after hard freezes, there were rapid warm spells, and the filters could easily have cracked."

The visitor admitted that secret documents from Sverdlovsk were kept in the archives of the KGB all the way until 4 December 1990. It was then that the USSR Council of Ministers issued a supersecret decree "On the Work on Special Projects" (most of those documents were signed at that time by N. Ryzhkov). That decree ordered that all secret papers be destroyed. It was to no avail that the state advisor on ecology and health care went to the then head of government I. Silayev.

**Former military Base No. 19** has been renamed about 10 times. First it was the Scientific Research Institute of Vaccine Preparations, and later, a sector of the Scientific Research Institute of Microbiology of the Ministry of

Defense. In December 1991, when even the veterans began to get confused about its name, the post received the name of Center for Military-Technical Problems of Biological Defense of the Scientific Research Institute of Microbiology of the Ministry of Defense.

At one time, everything was all so very simple. The Americans didn't even consider hiding the fact that in the early 1970s, they had about 10 kinds of biological weapons. So the specialists from Sverdlovsk, Kirov, Zagorsk, and other of our secret centers had to do "nothing more than" things like find a vaccine for known diseases, figure out the probable losses that would come from the use of those weapons, and develop plans for decontamination. The international convention that banned the development, production, storage, and acquisition of biological weapons ruined all that. In 1972, the convention was signed by the Soviet Union, too.

"Work like that has been done and is being done throughout the world," said Col. Gleb Arkhangelskiy, deputy chief of the Center for Science, brushing aside the digression. "After the signing of the convention, there were three international conferences, but a unified system for monitoring was never created. How do you determine, for example, whether strains of, say, brucellosis are being studied in a university laboratory, whether the work is being done for peaceful purposes or for military purposes, under orders from the Pentagon?"

People on the post don't like talking about the anthrax epidemic of 13 years ago. They explain that the center's specialists were not involved in the work of the commissions, that they were not approached for help, and that they didn't even see the results of the examinations of the sick individuals. Even though, perhaps, a better place for conducting any such research couldn't have been found.

The vaccination of the Sverdlovsk residents began about a month after the onset of the epidemic, when the number of dead had already reached into the dozens. The residents of Base No. 19 were vaccinated with an anthrax vaccine that was produced in the post's own laboratories not long before the tragedy.

"It had a great many advantages," explains Colonel Arkhangelskiy. "It was purer, less reactogenic. We asked for permission back then to 'treat' Sverdlovsk at least, but we never got a reply. Instead, they used a Tbilisi vaccine and vaccinated with a triple dose, well aware that there could be serious complications."

According to our information, nobody from Base No. 19 died from the anthrax.

In the years gone by, the center's specialists have been approached only once about that very vaccine. In January 1991, just before the start of the war in the Persian Gulf, when Saddam Hussein declared to the entire world that, in the event of military action, the Iraqi army would

use strains of that same anthrax. In Pentagon laboratories, either they didn't have the proper vaccine, or they simply didn't have it in proper quantities, but they approached the Soviet leadership with a request for it, explaining that the American army couldn't vaccinate all its soldiers.

"If they had approached us before 1985, we could have helped them," Arkhangelskiy says. "Back then, we had what was estimated as some 10 million man-doses of the vaccine on the post. But after 1985, we began receiving orders to shut down one research area after another, and we stopped producing our own vaccine. By 1985, we were already working on improved vaccines for that same anthrax and brucellosis, and we were doing research on glanders and melidiosis, for which there are no vaccines at all."

The center ended its active work a year ago. That's when all testing on the island of Vozrozhdeniye ceased ("Look, they shut down the testing ground, so how are you supposed to determine a lethal dose for a human if you don't test it on animal models?"). They switched to working with simulators, among which certainly not the last is that same anthrax vaccine.

The projects the specialists of the center are proposing today sound like a collection of science-fiction stories. They are preparing to do the following:

- cleanse maternity hospitals of staphylococcus
- disinfect poultry farms and railroad cars, removing every kind of fungus or mold
- destroy chemical weapons and highly toxic waste with their own bacteria
- clean up spills of oil and kerosene with microorganisms that will reprocess the oil into protein that will go in food for fish
- set up production of the very antibiotics that hospitals are so catastrophically short of

**Back then**, in 1979, the families and relatives of those who died were given compensation—50 rubles. Exactly 13 years later, on 4 April 1992, the president of Russia, as if covering up someone's guilt, signed the law "On Improving the Pensions of Families of Citizens Who Died As a Result of Anthrax in the City of Sverdlovsk in 1979."

Almost at the same time, Yeltsin finally admitted openly that, yes, our country had violated the Convention of 1972.

**Had not the son** of the chief physician of the Sverdlovsk Oblast Hospital gone to the university, the riddle of the Krasnoufimsk fields would probably never have come up.

In August 1989, the senior Sibertsev went to the Krasnoufimskiy Sovkhoz to visit his son. While waiting for the students to arrive from the onion fields, he noticed four girls with a strange gait: their feet were "slapping" against the ground. They were immediately sent to a

medical examination, in which disturbances in the nervous system activity were found—paresis (numbness) of the extremities.

It turned out that the strange illness had stricken more than 200 students that same year. And again, as had happened 10 years before, the medical luminaries went to Sverdlovsk. A commission of the USSR Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Defense, and the Institute of Biophysics arrived, as did state security specialists. In vain.

Initially, as usual, the students were blamed for everything. They probably drank beer with dichlorophos. Then it was said that the ill-starred fields contained toxic chemicals that exceeded the maximum permissible levels by 240-fold. But not a trace of pesticides was found in the blood of those who took sick.

Even though the health-epidemiological station banned the use of toxic chemicals throughout the entire oblast, new outbreaks of the illness occurred on the Krasnoufimsk fields last year. Similar symptoms were found in individuals working in fields in Belyarsk and Kamensk rayons. Questioning of the students revealed that they had felt similar symptoms even earlier, before 1989, but they were afraid to say so, for fear they would be considered malingerers.

The strange illness forced scientists to comb the vicinity of Krasnoufimsk. Now a new version of the cause was born. It turns out that near the fields is a secret facility—a "state reserve" warehouse of radioactive monocyte sand of the Pobeda combine. In the 1950s, it was laid in store under the personal order of Beriya, to be used for the production of nuclear weapons. The sand was of no use, and the warehouses were abandoned.

The oblast health-epidemiological station brought an action against the Ministry of Defense. Guards once again appeared at the warehouses. The radioactive version of the cause of the illness, however, remained just another version. In its place, a careful examination of urban and rural residents showed that the residents of Sverdlovsk Oblast—mainly, the children and teenagers—suffer from severe avitaminosis.

To date, the number of individuals who have come down with the strange illness is at 284. And although the mystery of the Krasnoufimsk fields is still unsolved, local kolkhoz workers and sovkhoz workers are sending the oblast government dispatches requesting that new students be sent to harvest the onions.

"We don't have a moral right to send students there," says V. Tretyakov, prorector of the Ural State University. "There won't be any orders given or any mandatory student detachments. After all, pesticides have been used there for several decades, and maybe toxic chemical agents have formed there..."

The most dangerous places will, perhaps, have to be left unharvested. The oblast health-epidemiological station

isn't too upset about that: The peak of unemployment is expected in Yekaterinburg by the fall. The fields not harvested by students will make for pretty good feeding for the poor in a cold winter.

**How many other unknown diseases are roaming about the former USSR?**

*"Unbeknownst to the rest of the world, a disease broke out 11 years ago in our city of Krasnoyarsk and then quietly disappeared, leaving in its wake nearly 500 sick children. Until now, only a handful of medical people and parents knew about it."*

*"My son was born in October 1980, and by November he was already being treated for pneumonia and came down with some mysterious disease that was later called uveitis. His temperature rose to 40° [centigrade], and conjunctivitis and a closing of the pupil began. The virus affected newborns only. Children in whom both eyes were affected were blinded even before they had learned to see. The disease was especially noted in blue-eyed children—the color of the affected eye would turn dark blue."*

*"They told us openly that there wouldn't be any improvement. At that time, in the thick of the battle for vision, they didn't look any farther. The official version that came down to the parents was something like, 'The ecological conditions in Krasnoyarsk have revived a virus that was 'asleep.' In January 1981, a delegation of medical people came to Krasnoyarsk from the Gelmgots Moscow Institute, where there were probably also some clues to the disease. A special uveal center was opened."*

*"And now this year, in the boarding school where our children are gathered, cases of hepatitis started to appear. Later, they were linked to the disease itself. It turns out that almost all the internal organs of the children have been affected, and they suspect that the brain is affected, too."*

*"We parents have our own version of what happened: secret tests of biological weapons, or waste from the 'numbered' enterprises..."*

**Testing of Biopreparations Near Alma-Ata Alleged**

92C0460A Alma-Ata KARAVAN in Russian  
22 May 92 p 1

[Article by O. Babiy, from Alma-Ata: "Yet Another Testing Ground, This One Near Alma-Ata?"; first paragraph is source introduction]

[Text] *The newspaper announcement said that in the vicinity of Alma-Ata, from 6 through 20 May, ground and aerial spraying with chemical and bacterial preparations would be performed to rid the woods of pests. For that reason, it is recommended that for 50 days, herbs not be harvested, cattle not graze there, and mushrooms not be picked.*

That report of the interoblast forest-protection station appeared six days after the spraying of the woods began. No less curious is this: Why was the ban period as long as a month and a half? In general, is it okay to eat vegetables, including early cabbage, which matures during that period around Alma-Ata, if the mushrooms cannot be eaten or the herbs harvested? We asked whether officials of the oblast agricultural enterprises and organizations were familiar with the report. Some would not answer. Others honestly admitted that they had not seen the announcement yet, but quite amiably rejected the warning about the cattle grazing; the chief argument was, of course, the lack of feed. This means that the wonderful milk will go to the urban-dweller's table with bacteriological impurities.

In the opinion of I. Mityayev, doctor of biological sciences and laboratory head at the Institute of Zoology of the republic's academy of sciences, Alma-Ata and vicinity could become a testing ground for checking the effects of foreign biopreparations. Who knows which is worse—a nuclear testing ground, or a bacteriological testing ground?

"The use of chemical and bacteriological preparations should be kept under strict control," Mityayev says. "Mankind has already seen the contamination of the environment during the period of the so-called chemical revolution of the 1960's. The high level of oncology diseases in the United States today, after years of good environmental conditions, can only be explained by past "sins"—the uncontrolled use of chemicals and of biological preparations untested in the laboratory.

"We need to learn from other people's mistakes, not repeat them. That is exactly why a zoological resource commission has been set up in our institute. Its specialists are well informed about the scientific achievements of our foreign colleagues and can produce a sound conclusion about what would happen if a given agent against pests were used. That will help avoid outbreaks of allergic illnesses and possible negative phenomena of a mutagenic nature in our republic. As it turns out, however, neither our institute nor our colleagues from either the Plant Protection Institute or the Ministry of Ecology and Bioresources have studied the preparations that were used to treat the woods around Alma-Ata. We wrote a letter to the ministry. I am afraid that that is not enough for the Alma-Ata residents to comprehend our alarm.

"If we do not create a reliable system for testing the new chemical and bacteriological agents that pour over to us from abroad, Kazakhstan may be threatened by a tragedy comparable to maybe the death of the Aral Sea."

**Secret Vozrozhdeniye Island BW Lab Abandoned**  
92P60344 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 23 Jun 92 p 6

[Article by Sergey Kozlov, under the rubric "Ecology": "Scientists Have Abandoned the Secret Laboratory".

subtitled "The Commission Has Simply Not Determined What Killed Hundreds of Thousands of Animals in the Aral Region"]

[Text] Until recently, Vozrozhdeniye Island in the Aral Sea was considered to be uninhabited. But in the okrug it was known that during the fifties a top secret base with a population of over a thousand had been built there, the residents of which were engaged in something secret and clandestine in the facility that had been created there—the field scientific research laboratory for means of indication of, and defense against, bacteriological weapons. Literally several kilometers from the test fields stood residences, schools, a nursery, a movie theatre, and a stadium.

The order to create a secret subunit on Vozrozhdeniye Island was signed in 1952. The work, however, began two years later. The area of the test range at that time was 200 square kilometers. At present, it has increased tenfold.

Today the secret base is empty. The people have been evacuated. Since last year the windows and doors of the residences, barracks, and the laboratory building have been boarded up. Because of the sharp reduction in financing for scientific research programs, no studies have been planned for this year. But, fear of bacteriological weapons in the republic remains

It intensified after the report that outbreaks of plague had been recorded in the Aral area. This is connected with the tests conducted on the chemical test range. Information began to appear about mass deaths of fish in the sea and of saiga [antelopes], and loss of wool and chemical skin burns in sheep.

At a session of the Kazakhstan parliament this January, president of the international committee "Aral-Asia-Kazakhstan", Mukhtar Shakhanov, said that the island's laboratories were still in operation and demanded their closing.

The Republic's cabinet of ministers immediately formed a commission on the activities of the test range on the island, under the leadership of the Kazakhstan minister of ecology and bioresources, Syatoslav Medvedev.

The commission officially announced that at present the laboratory on Vozrozhdeniye Island is not in operation, however, its conclusions sound somewhat vague. In particular, S. Medvedev reported, "As a government commission we carried out a specific mission and could not expand our sphere of authority. If the issue of checking the progress of the laboratory's research over 38 years is raised, then what is needed is a special commission—a scientific commission—which requires more than one year's work."

The commission's summary: "We ourselves have not established proven facts of negative influence by the laboratory on the environment, population, and animals. This does not mean that there were none. Perhaps they

existed at one time. Perhaps some tests were conducted, and on a scale unknown to us. Perhaps in those years certain complex situations occurred."

Thus, in 1991, the laboratory was mothballed. The personnel and population have been transferred to the Aralsk-5 military base. It was proposed that starting in 1992 scientific research on the island be conducted using the rotational shift method. Considering the existing negative public opinion, however, in November 1991, at a scientific council in Sergiyev Posad, a decision was made to terminate the experimental work on the island definitively.

The military are leaving the area, but plague is still breaking out here periodically. In the past five years two

major outbreaks of plague have been recorded in the local population. Although according to the information of the Central Asian Scientific Research Antiplague Institute and Aral Regional Hospital, they are of natural origin, people are persistently talking about the results of experiments on the test range. They are linking the mass deaths of saiga in the region to them. During the year before last, 434 thousand animals died. The causes of the mass deaths of saiga were, in fact, not determined.

We can conclude with Mukhtar Shakanov's words, which he said after visiting the test range in April of this year: "In the Aral region, people are still swallowing a poisonous mist and contracting lung cancer, plague, and intestinal diseases. But the local authorities are afraid to talk about this openly."

## FINLAND

### ABC Defense Capacity Called Inadequate

92EN0484A Helsinki HELSINKIN SANOMAT  
in Finnish 20 May 92 p A10

[Article by Erkki Pannanen: "Armed Forces Researcher Considers Toxic Gas Surveillance Weak; Army Would Also Like To Find War Gases That Sank in Gulf of Finland"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Major General Hannu Sarkio said Tuesday at the Protection Seminar in Tampere that recent events close to home make it important to improve protection against ABC—atomic, biological, and chemical—weapons.

According to Sarkio, it is unlikely that chemical weapons of the former Soviet Union are limited to Russia. "In any case, it is clear that several members of the Commonwealth of Independent States have the know-how to make chemical weapons," he pointed out.

It will take teamwork by specialists from countries bordering the Gulf of Finland to chart the substances that have sunk into the sea. Thus far, for example, Russia has been very reluctant to cooperate.

"If high-level politicians can effect an agreement, experts at charting underwater threats can be found in both countries," thinks Kantolahti.

Present at the Tampere seminar are experts from Sweden and England, as well as Finland, but none from the eastern or southern shores of the Gulf of Finland.

On a visit to St. Petersburg, Minister of Environment Sirpa Pietikainen (Conservative Party) heard a plea to remove chemical weapons from the Gulf of Finland. The targets must first be charted, according to the Finns.

### Gas Measured at Ylijarvi

The detection, dissemination, and tracking of hazardous substances are being discussed at the two-day Protection Seminar that began Tuesday in Tampere.

Participating in the seminar are some 150 Finnish, Swedish, and British scientists who specialize in chemical catastrophes and in the effects of ABC weapons.

Warning systems and other modes of protection are being examined at the seminar. The Armed Forces' new mobile field laboratory that can detect chemical substances easily and quickly was introduced on Tuesday. The laboratory's capacity was tested at a mock battlefield in Ylijarvi where imitation war gases were immediately analyzed. The laboratory can detect amounts as small as one hundred millionth of a gram.

The first facility is located at Vaajakoski, and it will be used to train reserves. The laboratory costs about 1 million markkas. [passage omitted]

## FRANCE

### Aerospatiale Halts Hades Missile Program

PM2206112892 Paris LE QUOTIDIEN DE PARIS  
in French 13-14 Jun 92 pp1,4

[Article by Marc Dufresse: "Mitterrand Abandons Final Warning"]

[Text] The president of the Republic has just made a decision which is essential for the future of the deterrence concept in France. Indeed, we learned yesterday that the General Delegation for Armaments [DGA] had notified Aerospatiale, the company manufacturing the French Hades tactical missile, of "the immediate and definitive discontinuation" of this missile.

The presidential decision was preceded last September by a "freeze" on this weapon. At the time, Francois Mitterrand announced that the Hades would henceforth be "stockpiled" at the Suippes camp in Marne and that, in any case, the implementation program would be frozen. Today a new step has been taken, and all the indications are that the missiles already built could be purely and simply destroyed.

The Hades, which was intended to replace the Pluton, is a tactical nuclear weapon mounted on a vehicle with a range of around 400km. Described in the French deterrence concept as a "prestrategic weapon," the Hades' mission was to give a final warning, to use the head of state's terminology. In other words, in case of an attack on France, the firing of this missile should be regarded as the final warning before the strategic nuclear strike. It is this stage which has now been eliminated. The French deterrent thus returns to the concept of "all or nothing" which existed before the prestrategic weapons. All being the launch of the entire French nuclear might and nothing being the abandonment of the use of nuclear weapons in case of serious threat to France's security and independence.

By abandoning Hades, Francois Mitterrand was probably trying to take account of the new international situation resulting from the collapse of the USSR and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. But he also, and more especially, wanted to respond to the pressing demands from the Germans who have long been asking him to abandon a missile which, given its range, was virtually bound to fall on German soil. At a time when Paris and Bonn are jointly trying to revive the European impetus, Mitterrand felt he had to give in to his partner's wishes.

The Hades surface-to-surface nuclear missiles, which the president of the Republic decided in September 1991 would be stockpiled and not deployed, are to immediately lose any operational character for the Armed Forces, reliable sources said yesterday.

The head of state has not yet officially made a decision to that effect, according to a reliable source. But the DGA, which is responsible for arms programs for the Defense

Ministry, has already given notice of "the immediate and definitive discontinuation" of the Hades program to its manufacturer, the Aerospatiale company, according to the company and to the DGA. In practical terms, Mr. Mitterrand's decision will result in an end to the military's "operational monitoring" of the stockpiled missiles and an end to the "maintenance" of the missiles by tests and checks carried out by industry, reliable sources state.

"The process will be irreversible because it will be impossible to retrain the people" and restore operational capability to the missiles which will, in the future, simply be "guarded," the same sources said.

The stockpiling of the Hades missiles by an Army artillery regiment, which President Mitterrand justified last September by the end of the "cold war", made it possible instead to restore these missiles rapidly to operational capability, observers point out.

Around 30 Hades missiles will finally have been built instead of the 120 initially planned in a program costing around 10 billion francs. The decision to finally abandon the Hades missile as an operational weapon accompanies President Mitterrand's recent decision to reduce France's level of nuclear alert. For the past year, other decisions relating to the French strike force which now no longer has the same priority as before, were successively made: the suspension of nuclear tests and the decision to abandon the building of the S-45 missile which was to replace the Albion Plateau missiles.

## GERMANY

### Paper Claims DPRK, PRC Sending Arms to Mideast

LD0407140692 Berlin ADN in German  
1321 GMT 4 Jul 92

[Text] Bonn (ADN)—According to WELT AM SONNTAG's information, there is increasing proliferation of missile technology and weapons of mass destruction in the Near and Middle East.

The PRC is currently supplying M-9 missiles with a range of 600 km to Syria, the newspaper reports, quoting intelligence circles. Apart from this, Iran, and probably Syria too, are receiving components from North Korea to build up a production capacity of their own for Scud missiles. Libya and North Korea are collaborating on the development of the Nadong medium-range missile. The Nadong is a further development of the Russian Scud-C missile with a range of 1,000 km. Libya is making available a relevant test-flight range.

According to an analysis by CIA Deputy Director Admiral William Studeman, which is in the newspaper's possession, given to a meeting of high-ranking NATO officers and diplomats at the beginning of June in Annapolis in the United States, "the most important countries in the Middle East already have stores with

chemical weapons which can be deployed against civilian or weakly-guarded military establishments". Thus the Libyans had produced "more than 100 tonnes" of chemical weapons before the Western intervention in Rabta. According to the CIA's information, Al-Qadhdhafi is planning the construction of a new poison gas factory.

### Third-World Nuclear Proliferation Reported

AU0607100092 Hamburg WELT AM SONNTAG  
in German 5 Jul 92 p 5

[Report by Michael J. Inacker: "The New Threat to Western Europe From a Belt Reaching From Algeria to North Korea"]

[Text] Hamburg—The world is facing the beginning of a new armaments age: "Proliferation" is a neutral term for the new threat to Western Europe from a belt that reaches from Algeria to North Korea. The "proliferation" of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons of mass destruction and the relevant delivery technology (missiles and long-range bombers) is taking place there increasingly faster and with an increasing scope.

The latest evidence: According to findings by the German intelligence services, which have become available to WELT AM SONNTAG, the PRC is currently supplying M-9 missiles (with a range of 600 km) to Syria. The North Koreans have sold components for the independent production of Scud-C missiles to Iran and probably also to Syria. In addition, the North Koreans have agreed with Libya on the establishment of a test site for the newly developed "Nadong" intermediate-range missiles (with a range of 1,000 km) in that North African country. This missile could reach as far north as Spain, Italy, and Greece.

The proliferation of modern weapons technology is taking place primarily in three fields:

—Chemical and biological weapons: They have long been the "nuclear weapons of the little man." According to an analysis by CIA Deputy Director Admiral William Studeman, given to a meeting of high-ranking NATO officers and diplomats in June in the U.S. city of Indianapolis, "the most important countries in the Middle East already have stores with chemical weapons that can be deployed against civilian or weakly defended military establishments." Thus, the Libyans had produced "more than 100 tonnes" of chemical weapons before the Western intervention. According to CIA information, Al-Qadhdhafi is also planning the construction of a new poison gas factory.

According to Western findings, some countries, such as Syria, Iran, and Iraq, are, in addition, working on biological weapons.

The advantage of chemical and biological weapons: Their production is relatively cheap and difficult to

verify in small research laboratories. In addition, biological and chemical weapons can be produced by simply converting civilian facilities (e.g., for the production of pesticides)—the so-called dual use.

—Nuclear weapons: The number of "nuclear threshold countries" is increasing. These are states that have been able to acquire the ability to produce plutonium, which can be used for the production of weapons, and thus the ability to construct a nuclear bomb during the 1990's and also have the will to become a nuclear power. These states include Iran, Syria, North Korea, and Iraq (even though to a limited extent because of UN supervision).

Furthermore, China is promoting the construction of a nuclear reactor in Algeria that could be used for the production of weapons-grade plutonium.

According to certain Western findings, Pakistan, India, China, and Israel are nuclear powers.

In this connection, attempts to hire nuclear scientists from the former Soviet Union are particularly significant. According to Bonn security circles, one nuclear weapons expert with a small staff would be sufficient to "substantively" push ahead development in nuclear threshold countries.

—Delivery systems: According to CIA Deputy Director Studeman, at the moment there are not enough delivery systems available, but within "this decade many states—from North Africa to South Asia"—will "acquire such delivery systems." The Scud-B/C missiles (with a range of 300/500 km), which come from Soviet production and can be equipped with chemical or nuclear warheads, are widespread. In particular Iraq—before the Gulf War—and North Korea have further developed the Scuds on their own and have

extended their range, although at the costs of precision. In addition, countries such as Egypt (in cooperation with Argentina), Israel, India, and Chile have developed their own systems, which have long and even strategic ranges (more than 5,000 km).

Most analysts ignore the technical (refueling in the air) and operational ability to use combat planes equipped to transport and drop weapons of mass destruction over long distances. Iran, Iraq, and Libya have this ability.

According to Western experts, Iran and Syria are currently pursuing the most aggressive armament with modern weapons technology. Both have purchased primarily Scud missiles with extended ranges in North Korea; Syria was able to use money from German aid during the Gulf war for this purpose.

Israel is playing a special role in the Middle East arms race. Even though the Israelis have nuclear and chemical weapons and the necessary means of delivery, the Israelis are defining their weapons in the Western sense, which means exclusively as a deterrent to potential attack as weapons of last recourse.

## TURKEY

### Reports of Nuclear Transfer to Pakistan Denied

TA0307152392 Ankara ANATOLIA in English  
1509 GMT 3 Jul 92

[Text] Ankara, July 3 (AA)—Turkish officials on Friday denied allegations that it was transferring sensitive equipment to Pakistan for its program to produce nuclear weapons. They told AA that the claim was totally baseless and aimed at harming Turkey.

Some American congressmen recently accused Turkey of helping Pakistan's nuclear program.

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